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## THESIS

**POLITICAL ETHNICITY:  
A NEW PARADIGM  
OF ANALYSIS**

by

**James H. Coffman Jr**

**June 1994**

**Thesis Advisor:**

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Ethnic conflict is a contemporary issue plaguing many states as the international system moves towards a "New World Order." However, despite the importance of ethnic-based violence and nationalistic social revolutions, current conflict theories do not adequately explain the fundamental dynamics of ethnic conflict or provide clear prescriptive policy guidance. This thesis articulates a model that describes and explains ethnic conflict. The fundamental purpose of this effort is two-fold. First, it provides a method to objectively examine and describe the fundamentals of ethnic-based conflicts, social, and political revolutions. Second, the paradigm provides decision makers with important prescriptions for foreign and domestic policies *vis-a-vis* ethnic conflict. To accomplish this goal, the thesis is divided into three main sections. Section one outlines the Political Ethnicity model. This four part model provides a simple yet powerful theoretical tool for analyzing ethnic conflict. Section two applies the model to three case studies. These illustrative case studies demonstrate the explanatory effectiveness of the Political Ethnicity paradigm in actual instances of ethnic conflict. Section three applies the conclusions drawn to guide policy decisions at both the international and domestic level. This systematic approach to ethnic conflict should provide policy makers in both the State and Defense Departments with a useful and objective decision making tool. The Political Ethnicity model dispels the mystery and myths that often surround contemporary ethnic conflicts.

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**Political Ethnicity: A New Paradigm of Analysis**

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
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
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## ABSTRACT

Ethnic conflict is a contemporary issue plaguing many states as the international system moves towards a "New World Order." However, despite the importance of ethnic-based violence and nationalistic social revolutions, current conflict theories do not adequately explain the fundamental dynamics of ethnic conflict or provide clear prescriptive policy guidance. This thesis articulates a model that describes and explains ethnic conflict. The fundamental purpose of this effort is two-fold. First, it provides a method to objectively examine and describe the fundamental of ethnic-based conflicts, social, and political revolutions. Second, the paradigm provides decision makers with important prescriptions for foreign and domestic policies *vis-a-vis* ethnic conflict. To accomplish this goal, the thesis is divided into three main sections. Section one outlines the Political Ethnicity model. This four part model provides a simple yet powerful theoretical tool for analyzing ethnic conflict. Section two applies the model to three case studies. These illustrative case studies demonstrate the explanatory effectiveness of the Political Ethnicity paradigm in actual instances of ethnic conflict. Section three applies the conclusions drawn to guide policy decisions at both the international and domestic level. This systematic approach to ethnic conflict should provide policy makers in both the State and Defense Departments with a useful and objective decision making tool. The Political Ethnicity model dispels the mystery and myths that often surround contemporary ethnic conflicts.

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
## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

*Ethnic Conflict.* The name alone conjures forth CNN provided visions of angry camouflaged youths with guns, crying old women with dead children, streams of refugees with no hope, United States Marines buried under tons of concrete, land mine-produced multiple amputees, and illegal covert funding. Mass media satellite links and facsimile machines provide twenty-four hour information from around our *global city* and focus our attention on strife in regions that we previously ignored. The *New World Disorder* brings with it quantum social changes, often accompanied by armed violence.

Despite recent media attention, ethnic conflict is not a new phenomenon. It has plagued political, economic, and social, interaction since primeval ethnic consciousness emerged hundreds, if not thousands, of years ago. The contemporary issue, however, is politically mobilized, operationally organizing aspects of ethnicity. The hyper-nationalistic and transnational aspects of these conflicts portend severe consequences in several ethnically heterogeneous states.

In his book *Revolutionary Change*, Chalmers Johnson states that "Revolution is social change." While revolutions may be social changes, they are more importantly political changes. Political realities are, after all, a manifestation of the socioeconomic environment. Many of today's political changes have taken on ethnic characteristics that reflect a virtual explosion of intense nationalism.

During the Twentieth Century, there have been at least three distinct periods of nationalistic movements: Post World War I, Post World War II/Colonialism, Post Former Soviet Union (see Figure 1). These nationalistic movements either created new states or saw the independence of historically distinct states.



**Figure 1.** Nationalism

Unfortunately, many of these nationalistic movements did not create ethnically homogeneous states. Instead, ethnically heterogeneous states experienced dynamic tensions that often led to violent conflicts between competing communal groups. Using code phrases like *self-determination*, *freedom*, *independence*, *ethnic cleansing*, and *homelands*, the leaders of ethnic movements mobilized their constituents to galvanize nationalism with political objectives. It is this operational aspect of ethnicity based on primordial ties that is revolutionary and potentially explosive.

Ethnic groups are not necessarily political. While an ethnic group may have a sense of a unique identity, it does not necessarily follow that there will be an associated violent ethnic movement. Indeed, there may be no movement at all except assimilation into a

dominant ethnic group culture. Threatening government actions, however, tend to evoke a negative reaction. The effort of governments to suppress forcibly ethnic unrest assists ethnic and communal leaders in their efforts to transform subliminal ethnic identity into an operational one. This political aspect of ethnicity is the basis of the political ethnicity paradigm.

Political ethnicity theory is a hybrid of both conflict analysis and descriptive theories. This synthetic blend provides a comprehensive picture and illustrates the vast range of dynamic variables that ethnic conflicts revolve around. In summary, political ethnicity theory explains ethnic conflict using a combination of the other theories with ethnicity as a skeletal basis. The four components of political ethnicity theory (ethnic group identification, sources of ethnic conflict, ethnic group goals, and government responses) are a systematic approach to this contemporary issue. Each of the three case studies illustrates the practical application of political ethnicity theory to contemporary ethnic conflicts and leads to four primary conclusions.

First, the presence of transnational ethnic groups faced with repressive government actions increases the level of ethnic conflict. In each of the case studies, the most violent ethnic minority was one that was also transnational. This is not surprising since these groups have an outside source of support to reinforce their actions against a harsh and repressive regime.

Second, horizontally stratified societies exacerbate inherent societal inequities. Although this tension increases violence when coupled with other sources of ethnic

conflict. it is not a primary cause of ethnic-based turmoil nor does it alone provoke violence.

Third, government strategies towards ethnic groups do make a difference. As the case studies effectively illustrate, violent ethnic conflict is mostly associated with strategies of containment. As governments attempt to repress ethnic group demands for political, social, and economic power, ethnic identity is reified. Ethnic group and communal leaders are then able to translate this primordial ethnic identity into an effective operational ethnic identity in opposition to the government. While it is certainly true that strong central governments can effectively restrain ethnic conflict with overwhelming application of force, this strategy of containment is a short term solution that eventually leads to increased violence.

Strategies of accommodation, on the other hand, allow for political, social, and economic freedom of minority ethnic groups. These expressions tend to be peaceful and less threatening to a central government as political, social, and economic power is *shared* between competing ethnic groups. Thus, the basis of ethnic conflict is transmuted and diffused, eliminating the support base of ethnic and communal leaders. The overall result is that with the loss of their ethnic constituency and *raison d'ete* for ethnic-based strife, the inherent tensions of society are reduced to a manageable level of conflict. Therefore, strategies of accommodation are long term solutions to ethnic conflict since they significantly reduce the level of violence.

Although there are many other examples of terminated or ongoing ethnic conflicts, Azerbaijan, Lebanon, and Nicaragua are excellent illustrative case studies that support the three conclusions above. These three examples demonstrate a blend of ethnic conflict factors with differing results. These results are summarized in the table below and provide a basis of comparing different state conditions and outcomes.

### Ethnic Conflict Summary

State	Primary Ethnic Identifier	Trans-national Ethnic Group	Government Strategy Pattern	Stratification	Conflict Termination (1994)
<i>Azerbaijan</i>	Language	Yes	C - A - C	Mixed Vertical	No
<i>Lebanon</i>	Religion	Yes	A - C	Mixed Vertical	No
<i>Nicaragua</i>	Genetics	No	A - C - A	Horizontal	Yes

Fourth, with the end of the Cold War, violent conflicts in general have become increasingly more regional in nature. Despite the horrible atrocities associated with ethnic conflicts, they do not always require intervention from states outside the affected region. Indeed, foreign involvement tends to increase the level of violence rather than mitigate or end it. As with any civil war, ethnic conflicts stop when one of three events occur: one belligerent party wins, all belligerent parties become too exhausted to continue, or there is a negotiated settlement equally unfavorable for all. Unfortunately, external interference prolongs ethnic conflict and prevents one of these three conditions from being

met. To put it simply, ethnic conflicts eventually "burn themselves out" if competing groups are left alone.


## I. INTRODUCTION

*Ethnic Conflict.* The name alone conjures forth CNN provided visions of angry camouflaged youths with guns, crying old women with dead children, streams of refugees with no hope, United States Marines buried under tons of concrete, land mine-produced multiple amputees, and illegal covert funding. Mass media satellite links and facsimile machines provide twenty-four hour information from around our *global city*<sup>1</sup> and focus our attention on strife in regions that we previously ignored. *The New World Disorder* brings with it quantum social changes, often accompanied by armed violence.<sup>2</sup>

Despite recent media attention, ethnic conflict is not a new phenomenon. It has plagued political, economic, and social, interaction since primeval ethnic consciousness emerged hundreds, if not thousands, of years ago. The contemporary issue, however, is the politically mobilized, operationally organizing aspects of ethnicity. What is most important, the hyper-nationalistic and transnational aspects of these conflicts portend severe consequences in several ethnically heterogeneous states.<sup>3</sup>

In his book *Revolutionary Change*, Chalmers Johnson states that "Revolution is social change."<sup>4</sup> While revolutions may be social changes, they are more importantly political changes. Political realities are, after all, a manifestation of the socioeconomic environment. Many of today's political changes have taken on ethnic characteristics that reflect a virtual explosion of intense nationalism.<sup>5</sup>

During the Twentieth Century, there have been at least three distinct periods of nationalistic movements: Post World War I, Post World War II/Colonialism, Post Former Soviet Union (see Figure 2). These nationalistic movements either created new states or saw the independence of historically distinct states.



**Figure 2. Nationalism**

Unfortunately, many of these nationalistic movements did not create ethnically homogeneous states. Instead, ethnically heterogeneous states experienced dynamic tensions that often led to violent conflicts between competing communal groups. Using code phrases like *self-determination*, *freedom*, *independence*, *ethnic cleansing*, and *homelands*, the leaders of ethnic movements mobilized their constituents to galvanize nationalism with political objectives. It is this operational aspect of ethnicity based on primordial ties that is revolutionary and potentially explosive.

#### **A. OBJECTIVES**

This thesis has two fundamental objectives. First, I explore the dynamics of ethnic conflict. This exploration attempts to discover how the primordial aspects of ethnicity are

translated into an operational and political reality. Further, I examine the transformation of ethnic group political objectives into conflict with other ethnic groups and the government. Finally, I outline government strategies of conflict resolution and the effects these strategies have on politically mobilized ethnic groups. This analytical framework, or political ethnicity paradigm, is a systematic approach to understanding the dynamics of ethnic conflict as a contemporary issue.

Second, I examine the policy implications associated with ethnic conflict. These policy implications are at both the international and state level of analysis. As a contemporary issue facing decision makers, ethnic conflict demands resolution. It does little good to provide an analytical paradigm if that model does not assist the decision making process. This thesis attempts to provide some possible directions for policies concerning ethnic conflict not only at the state level but also at the international level.

## **B. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY**

My thesis is the result of an examination of current conflict theories and sociological studies of ethnicity. It quickly became apparent that conflict theories with their predominantly single variable approach could not adequately explain the complex dimensions of ethnic conflict. Similarly, sociology, in particular cultural anthropology, only provided a description of ethnicity and human motivation factors. Obviously, to understand ethnic conflicts more fully required a multi-discipline, multi-variable approach.

The political ethnicity paradigm is a multi-variable reduction and synthesis of these various disciplines into a single integrated analytical framework. As with any model,

there are some variables that are either ignored or controlled. In the case of political ethnicity, I concentrated on the factors and processes that transformed primordial ethnic identity into operational and potentially conflictive situations. The four part political ethnicity paradigm yielded several hypotheses. However, again for simplicity of analysis, only three are examined within this thesis. Further, the political ethnicity paradigm is then blended into crisis management theory to extract policy implications at both the state and international level of analysis.

To test the three hypotheses, I conducted a controlled comparative analysis using three case studies. The case studies were selected based on several different criteria. First, different geographical areas avoided the problem of regional specificity. Second, the case studies represent not only discrete primary ethnic identification factors but also various and dissimilar patterns of government responses to ethnic conflict. Finally, I chose case studies that did and did not include transnational ethnic groups to determine the impact that variable had on ethnic conflicts.

### **C. ORGANIZATION**

This paper focuses on ethnic conflict in three steps. Chapter II discusses political ethnicity and establishes the analytical framework for case study analysis. In Chapters III, IV, and V I apply the political ethnicity model to three case studies to determine how well the paradigm phenomenologically explains ethnic conflict. Chapter VI is an exploration into how political ethnicity can be blended with crisis management theory and the implications for ethnic conflict. Finally, in Chapter VII, a comparison of the three

illustrative states combined with deterrence, compellence and crisis management theory not only proves the utility of political ethnicity theory but also suggests some important conclusions about government policies.

## II. POLITICAL ETHNICITY THEORY

Any analysis of how governments respond to ethnic conflict must be divided into at least two levels: the international system and state level. There are, however, several immediate difficulties with using current prevalent crisis management, conflict, and level of analysis theories.<sup>6</sup> The political ethnicity theory attempts to correct the difficulties of other analytical methods described below.

First, ethnic groups are non-state actors. Although at times they are organized, control territory, and display some common traits of a state, ethnic groups are seldom recognized by the international community as having state status.<sup>7</sup> Second, political economy and political development theories emphasize a single variable as the primary source of conflict. This emphasis not only discounts other factors but significantly restricts analytical efforts. Third, cultural anthropology provides descriptive analysis of distinct groups of people but does not address conflict.

Political ethnicity theory is a hybrid of both conflict analysis and descriptive theories. This synthetic blend provides a comprehensive picture and illustrates the vast range of dynamic variables that ethnic conflicts revolve around. In sum, political ethnicity theory explains ethnic conflict using a combination of the other theories with ethnicity as a skeletal basis. The following discussion outlines the four components of political ethnicity theory: ethnic group identification, sources of ethnic conflict, ethnic group goals,

and government responses. Each of the three case studies illustrates the practical application of political ethnicity theory to contemporary ethnic conflicts.

### **A. DEFINING ETHNIC GROUPS**

Any discussion of ethnic groups must begin with a definition of what comprises ethnicity.<sup>8</sup> The components of ethnicity can be divided between major and minor determinants. The combination of the various determinate variables, major and minor, is the calculus that differentiates ethnic groups. This approach to ethnic group definition is a blend of social and natural science.

#### **Ethnicity Components**

Major Determinants	Language, Religion, Genetics
Minor Determinants	Geography, Culture, History, Economy

Major determinants can stand alone. These ethnic variables are explicit enough that they can, on a macro level, define and delineate one ethnic group from others. Minor determinants do not stand alone. These determinants cannot define an ethnic group by themselves. However, minor determinants add depth, reinforce, and enhance ethnic group definitions and differentials based on the major determinants.

#### **1. Major Determinants**

There are three major determinant factors in ethnic group definition: language, religion, and genetics. Language is perhaps the most important determinant of ethnic group identity.<sup>9</sup> If nothing else, language decides the basic framework in which people

describe and view their natural environment.<sup>10</sup> It becomes the filter of interpretation and affinity with other human beings. It is the cognitive elements of thought, emotion, and expression that attenuate perceptions of the physical environment. Moreover, people feel a natural affinity and identification with others who speak a common language. Common language allows them to communicate freely and establish a cognitive bond. As a cognitive bond, language is the medium people use to express shared beliefs, attitudes, norms, values, and knowledge.

Religion is another important determinant in ethnic affiliation. It is the spiritual and moral influence in an ethnic group's identity based on their perceived relationship with a supernatural entity. Religious norms shape the way individuals within ethnic groups interact with other members of society. In some religions, spiritual laws permeate all aspects of an ethnic group's distinctiveness. Although religious standards are often codified, they are normally used to describe acceptable social behavior. Finally, religion can influence education within an ethnic group. New ideas that conflict with existing religious tenants are considered sacrilegious and rejected.

The last major determinant in ethnic classification is genetics.<sup>11</sup> Skin color, body type, and facial features are the most visible symbols of ethnic group affiliation. The classification of ethnic groups based on distinctive genetics ranges from biological to legal definitions. In a micro-analysis, genetics is only a somatic birth right definition. In a macro-analysis, genetics forms the basis for many formal, legal descriptions of ethnic

groups. Like language, common genetic features tend to promote affinity within an ethnic group.

## **2. Minor Determinants**

There are four minor determinant elements: geography, culture, history, and economy. Geography contributes to ethnic group affiliation when it promotes a sense of isolation from other groups. Groups that are physically separated from other human beings take on unique characteristics and patterns of behavior. They view other people from beyond their physical boundaries as outsiders who do not share the same values. Isolation alienates ethnic groups from other people and intensifies local customs without infusion of new ideas.

Culture is usually incorrectly expressed as the religion and language of an ethnic group. Although similar to these major determinants, culture is the outward manifestation of the combination of an ethnic group's attitudes, beliefs, norms, values, aesthetics and lifestyles.<sup>12</sup> Ethnic groups maintain and emphasize cultural traditions to promote uniqueness. This emphasis helps one ethnic group to maintain an individual identity that is different from other ethnic groups that share common determinants.

Another minor ethnic determinant is history. Like culture, the written and oral history of an ethnic group provides them with a feeling of uniqueness. Their collective experiences as a group divides them from other people who otherwise share many similar ethnic determinants. This natural affiliation is greatly enhanced when history is skewed to emphasize the importance of a particular ethnic group.

Finally, economic patterns stratify societies into functional ethnic groups.<sup>13</sup> In communities where the division of labor is linked to social class, ethnic group stratification is even more important. Peasants are viewed differently than factory workers; professionals are divided from bureaucrats. Functionally segregated societies founded on traditional and legal distinctions are explosive. Class distinction is an extreme form of economic-based ethnic group identification.

The combination of the major and minor determinants, however, is not the final resolution that defines ethnicity. People belong to one ethnic group or another by merely believing that they do. In many respects, therefore, ethnicity is self-defining.

## **B. SOURCES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT**

All heterogeneous societies and states experience a constant dynamic tension between competing ethnic groups. The primordial source of this ethnic conflict is the struggle for power. The quintessential and purest aspiration of ethnic conflict is redistribution of power within a society. Although there are many different ways this societal friction manifests itself, peacefully or violently, the basic impetus of an ethnic group in conflict is to maintain or increase their relative power. In a socioeconomic sense, ethnic groups compete for scarce resources. In a political sense, they compete for authority.<sup>14</sup>

Ethnic groups in conflict direct their competitive struggle toward two distinct opponents: the government and other ethnic groups. Although the root cause of the confrontation with the prevailing government or other ethnic groups is still based on power, the two categories of conflict can be further refined. These subdivisions are not

mutually exclusive and all ethnic strife involves multiple, reinforcing reasons for conflict

However, for simplicity and clarity, I will address each separately

### Categories of Ethnic Conflict

Governmental	Ethnic Preference Social/Political Mobilization
Inter-Ethnic Group	Class Ethnic Chauvinism/Racism Survival

#### 1. Conflicts with the Government

Ethnic group conflicts with the government have two ingredients: ethnic preference and inadequate institutions to handle social/political mobilization. Many states have public policies or laws that favor one ethnic group over another. The most invidious evidence of preferential treatment is government sponsored ethnic discrimination in the areas of public service, education, political parties, housing, and jobs.<sup>15</sup> The "politics of dominance"<sup>16</sup> alienates and disenfranchises disadvantaged ethnic groups by denying them equal or fair access to economic resources and political institutions. Rebellion, revolt, or social revolution is the natural result.

Ethnic groups are not inherently political.<sup>17</sup> But, strong ethnic leaders can mobilize ethnic groups when governments fail to meet "minimum expectations."<sup>18</sup> Mobilized ethnic groups place a tremendous strain on the structures of government, especially in societies with unresponsive or underdeveloped institutions.<sup>19</sup> The net result is the same frustration found in societies with preferential policies. Directed political

activism provides an outlet for these frustrations. If demands are not met, there is potential for political instability and social revolution. Thus, without sufficient institutional recourse to diffuse socioeconomic and political frustrations, mobilized ethnic groups are inevitably propelled into conflict with the government.

## **2. Conflicts with Other Ethnic Groups**

Class becomes an issue in stratified societies when mobility opportunities are limited or restricted by ethnic identity. Incipient antagonism results when the lower class believes that the upper class is responsible for this suppression of upward mobility opportunities. The natural objects of their resentment, anger, and hostility are any or all of the higher class ethnic groups. Violence and belligerence occur when there are no legitimate outlets for the underprivileged and disadvantaged ethnic groups' fury.

While the confrontation rhetoric of ethnic group leaders normally speaks of specific inequalities in socioeconomic and power distribution, the subliminal message is usually, if not always, a comparison of human net worth. Ethnic chauvinism and racism are simply different degrees of promoting the predominance of one ethnic group based solely on its ethnicity. This is the most insidious and dangerous element of ethnic conflict. People are capable of tremendous atrocities when they believe that the object of their violence is subhuman or innately inferior. This *moral disengagement* is common when ethnic groups resort to terrorism to achieve their socioeconomic and political goals.<sup>20</sup>

Finally, ethnic groups do not voluntarily disappear. One of the most powerful human emotions is survival. The fear of extinction is a powerful motivation for ethnic groups to maintain their ethnicity. They will forcibly resist assimilation by other ethnic groups even when resistance is prejudicial to upward mobility or advancement. Although individuals may temporarily submerge their ethnicity to gain an advantage in a stratified society, they never divorce themselves completely from their ethnic affiliation.<sup>21</sup> This affiliation remains submerged just below the surface and can quickly emerge when affronted by a different ethnic group.

### **C. DEFINING ETHNIC GROUP GOALS**

Ethnic movements as social revolutions translate the elements of conflict described above into specific goals. As also discussed earlier, these goals are inherently attempts to gain political, social, and concomitant economic power. The leaders of nationalistic power struggles appeal to ethnic group identity to achieve a consensus and promote their ideologies. This dynamic shift from primordial to operational ethnicity, directed by ethnic group and communal leaders, is essential to understanding political ethnicity. These movements can be divided into three basic types: separatism, integration, and ethnocratism. Each class of movement is subdivided based on the political goals of the participants.<sup>22</sup> This typology is important to distinguish between purposeful change and what is otherwise unidirectional, undisciplined, and ubiquitous hyper-nationalism.

## Typology of Ethnic Movements

Type	Political Goal	Examples
Separatist	Autonomy	Kurds, Basque
	Secession	Croatia, Slovenia
Integrationist	Irredentism	Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Northern Ireland
	Congregation (Diaspora)	Israel, Palestine
Ethnocratist	Equality	Lebanon, S. Africa
	Dominance	Uganda, Rwanda

### 1. Separatist

Separatist movements involve a consolidation of political power in a region defined by a homogeneous or dominant ethnic group. These movements are subdivided based on two distinct political goals. Autonomist desire a region within an existing state that allows them political determinism. Conversely, secessionist desire to establish a completely *new* and distinct political entity or nation-state.

### 2. Integrationist

Integration movements are also subdivided into two political goals. Irredentist aims are redefinition of political boundaries based on ethnic identity. This involves consolidating an ethnic group that has been separated artificially by state boundaries. Often, these boundaries were arbitrary decisions of colonial powers or other imperialistic

actions. Congregation, on the other hand, results from the diaspora of an ethnic group. Simply stated, it is the "search for a homeland." Several ethnic groups have been forcibly uprooted from their traditional geographical locations and disbursed around the world. While retaining an ethnic identity, their political goal is to establish a homeland where all of the refugees can consolidate and form a homogeneous society. This can be within the geographical boundaries of an existing state or by creation of a new one.

### **3. Ethnocratist**

As described earlier, many societies have laws and political systems that grant special status to certain ethnic groups at the expense of others. Ethnocratic movements involve renegotiation of these existing preferential policies. Desired political changes can follow one of two paths. Some movements merely want political equality for their ethnic group. Other, more radical movements, attempt to displace the authority of the ruling ethnic group and replace the government with one dominated by their own ethnic group.

### **D. GOVERNMENT RESPONSES**

Ethnic conflict *is* both political and social revolution. Ethnic groups engaged in revolution invoke many governmental responses. Although the essence of government action is always power diffusion, specific strategies fall into two broad categories: *strategies of accommodation* and *strategies of containment*. Similarly, Huntington divides governments into two categories, civic and praetorian.<sup>23</sup> While he argues that specific policies or strategies of power diffusion are dependent variables based on the relative

degree of institutionalization in the affected society, the essential division is between accommodation and containment of political and social mobilization.

### **1. Strategies of Accommodation**

Democratic regimes and governments generally respond to ethnic conflict with *strategies of accommodation*. The general goal of these strategies is to *peacefully* resolve ethnic conflict before it escalates to violence. These strategies involve bargaining, compromise and consensus as the central government attempts to deter armed violence by an ethnic group through conciliation and negotiated settlements rather than the threat of violence. However, since the ethnic group is nearly always the weaker party, there is still an implied threat. Nonetheless, this strategy is particularly effective at diffusing violent ethnic conflict since it concedes to the political (and often socio-economic) goals of the rebelling ethnic groups. Thus, the state under siege by an ethnic uprising defends itself through artful negotiations.

### **2. Strategies of Containment**

Unlike democratic or civic political systems, autocratic, totalitarian, or praetorian regimes and governments more often invoke *strategies of containment*. These strategies always involve a strong element of coercive compellence as the state actions attempts behavior modification. Ethnic groups are coerced into acceptable actions through punishment. This is brutal power in raw form. However, as stated earlier, the survival instinct is extremely powerful and the net effect of excessive suppression is a prolongation of ethnic conflict rather than early termination.

## Illustrative Government Strategies

Accomodation	Containment
Confederation Autonomy Federalism Multi-cultural Assimilation Proportional Representation	Internment Forced Relocation Expulsions Deportations Attrition

### E. HYPOTHESES

Although political ethnicity theory generates several possible hypotheses, only three are used for a discussion within the international context. First, government strategies of containment are the primary causes of violent ethnic conflict. The genesis for this hypothesis rests with the issue of survival. Government strategies of containment threaten ethnic groups in the most basic sense. It is logical, therefore, that ethnic and communal groups faced with repressive government policies that they *perceive* to be life threatening will respond violently.

Second, the presence of transnational ethnic groups increases the level of armed violence. Transnational ethnic groups enjoy an escape valve that single state ethnic groups do not - automatic external support. As transnational groups, some communal groups can appeal to outside sources of support for their struggle against a government. This immediately escalates the scope of a conflict and the intensity of the ethnic conflict.

Third, horizontally stratified ethnic societies are more prone to violent ethnic conflict.

Stratified societies that reinforce the ethnic differences through the distribution of political, social, and economic power are much less likely to peacefully resolve their conflicts. This conflict factor is additive to others and increases the level of violence

## **F. CONCLUSIONS**

The political ethnicity paradigm is an extremely useful analytical tool to examine ethnic conflict. By systematically reducing ethnic conflict to its vital components, an analyst or decision maker can methodically determine root causes and subsequent viable policy options. Although it does not include every variable possible, political ethnicity overcomes the limitations of single variable analysis inherent in prevalent conflict theories. Moreover, it also demonstrates utility as a descriptive approach to classification of ethnic groups within states.

### III. CASE STUDY: AZERBAIJAN

*Nagorno-Karabakh.* The Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh rivets world attention to the ethnic problems within Azerbaijan. Armed violence and the Armenian invasion of Azerbaijan painfully illustrates the extent of ethnic hatred and destructive competition this former Soviet state currently suffers with. However, the former Russian rulers not only established some of the root causes of this conflict but also are the solution.

#### A. ETHNIC GROUP IDENTIFICATION

There are three *genuses* of peoples that inhabit the modern political state of Azerbaijan: Altaic, Caucasian, and Indo-European (See TABLE 1).<sup>24</sup> Within these three general designations, seven primary nations live in the state of Azerbaijan.<sup>25</sup> The most numerous and widespread nation is the Azerbaijani. The Russian and Armenians are the next largest groups followed by several smaller, though distinguishable, nations. An analysis of the ethnic determinants of these nations accents some important societal cleavages and differentials.

##### 1. Major Determinants

###### *a. Language*

The importance of language to ethnic identification cannot be overstated.<sup>26</sup> The single distinct factor of ethnicity that differentiates the nations of Azerbaijan is their

native spoken tongue (see TABLE 2). The Azerbaijani and Russian language to nation correlation is the highest at nearly one hundred percent.<sup>27</sup> A lower but still significant correlation of the Armenians is partially attributable to their common knowledge of Russian. This bilingual condition represents the long and close ties between the Armenians and the Russians. At the other end of the spectrum, the Tsakhur and Talysh nations are undergoing a rapid assimilation process. The loss of their spoken language substantially accelerates this incorporation into the Azerbaijani nation.<sup>28</sup>

The written script of language is equally consequential. Only the Russians and Armenians have retained their original written scripts (see TABLE 4).<sup>29</sup> Again, this emphasizes the special status that these two nations have historically enjoyed within Azerbaijan.

***b. Religion***

Azerbaijan rests squarely at the decisive point that historically divides the Christian from the Islamic world. Similarly, religious affiliations are closely related to ethnic identification in Azerbaijan. This factor divides the state into Christians and Muslims (see TABLE 3). Most of the population is Shi'ite with a substantial Sunni minority. On the other hand, The Russians and Armenians are Eastern Orthodox. These religious differences further reinforce the language cleavages.

**2. Minor Determinants**

The minor determinants of geography, culture, history, and economy contribute to the division of Azerbaijani society. First, there are three peripheral mountainous

regions. Each has an associated resident ethnic group. The Dagestanis are in the north; the Iranians are in the southeast; the Armenians are in the infamous western Nagorno-Karabakh.<sup>30</sup> This does not imply that these nations are geographically restricted. It merely means that the mountainous regions not only have the heaviest concentration of these groups but also provide them with a sense of isolation and separateness.

Also significant is the mountainous Autonomous Region of Nakhichevan. Although physically separated from the remainder of Azerbaijan, the central Azerbaijani government maintains administrative control over Nakhichevan. This unique situation was arrived at based on the large Azerbaijani population in the region and stands in sharp contrast to the parallel condition in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Conversely, the major Russian concentrations surround the capitol city, Baku (see TABLE 5). This proximity to the capitol grants the Russians greater access to the seat of power. Moreover, it makes the Russian presence much more noticeable than if they were confined to distant mountain districts.

Second, each of the three primary nations fiercely guards their cultural heritage. Again, it is difficult to separate the Christian and Islam cultures from their religious affiliations. Simply, the two ethnic elements reinforce and mutually support each other. Similarly, history accentuates the religious cleavages. The Christian and Muslim histories differ greatly for the area in historical interpretation of events.<sup>31</sup>

## **B. SOURCES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT<sup>32</sup>**

### **1. Historical Perspective**

To understand the roots of ethnic conflict in Azerbaijan, we must turn to the historical development and experience of the region.<sup>33</sup> Without a proper appreciation for this context, the current ethnic strife seems mysterious and imponderable.<sup>34</sup> History has not been kind to the Transcaucus area. Conquest and domination have strongly influenced intergroup relations as competing Christian and Muslim forces fought to control Azerbaijan's oil resources.<sup>35</sup> In succession, the Armenian, Ottoman, Tsarist Russian, and Soviet Empires have conquered and colonized the people of Azerbaijan.<sup>36</sup> Each successive wave left a lasting political, economic, and social mark on the modern state.

The legacy of the *politics of domination* is a loosely horizontally stratified Azerbaijan state and society.<sup>37</sup> Years of colonial and Soviet rule resulted in the Russian and Armenians minorities occupying many of the upper positions of society (see TABLE 13-14).<sup>38</sup> While the Russian authority was acquiesced to, the Armenians were widely resented. The Azerbaijanis viewed the Armenians as opportunist and surrogates for the Russians.<sup>39</sup> As a member of the USSR, the Azerbaijani majority had to accept this condition. With independence, however, the newly empowered Azerbaijani political leaders seized the opportunity to correct perceived wrongs.

## **2. Political**

Until Azerbaijan gained independence from Moscow in 1991, the state was subjected to *federal colonization* along with the other non-Russian republics.<sup>40</sup> Ethnic Russians dominated, subjugated, and ruled Azerbaijan following the Tsarist colonial precedence.<sup>41</sup> Although, the Soviet administrators have departed, one of their political legacies in Azerbaijan is pro-Russian patronage.<sup>42</sup> This extensive patronage system insures that Russian ethnic groups and their Azerbaijani supporters will continue to receive preferential treatment at the expense of other groups.

Another source of conflict is the controversy over the political status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Today, the political and ethnic leaders of this predominately Armenian area feel politically impotent against the Azerbaijani majority. The withdrawal of Nagorno-Karabakh's autonomous status in 1991 while Nakhichevan remains semi-independent compounds this frustration. Further, the sudden withdraw of the Armenian's Soviet support base amplifies a general feeling of disenfranchisement.

## **3. Economic**

The most powerful economic institution in Azerbaijan is the oil industry.<sup>43</sup> Historically, Azerbaijani nationals owned the oil companies, Russians and Armenians ran them, and Azerbaijani workers along with minority immigrants provided raw labor (see Table 13-14). This ethnic stratification crystallized societal friction between the skilled (Russian and Armenian) and unskilled (Azerbaijani and "Persian") workers.<sup>44</sup> Despite the frictions, during the prosperous economic years, this arrangement benefitted everyone.

However, oil production and related industries have been on a sharp downward trend for the past ten years with a corresponding negative effect on the Azerbaijani economy (see TABLE 9-11).<sup>45</sup>

Although in Baku the Azerbaijanis were wealthy industrialists and merchants, most were subsistence peasants in the countryside.<sup>46</sup> This contrasted sharply with the affluent Russians and Armenians who principally occupied Baku and other major cities.<sup>47</sup> Russian and Armenian concentrations in the cities put these two ethnic groups in direct competition with upwardly mobile and ambitious Azerbaijani *petty bourgeoisie*. The ensuing friction has routinely and often turned explosive. The 1988 Sumgait and Baku pogroms were merely the most recent manifestation of this hostility. Still, the pattern of domination by Russian and Armenian of middle class positions suggests that there is less economic opportunities for the majority Azerbaijani nation.

Despite the abundance of the Russians and Armenians in urban areas, they too, contributed to some peasant migrations. In the countryside, displaced Azerbaijani peasants particularly resented the arrival of Russian peasants who settled around Baku.<sup>48</sup> Similarly, Armenian peasants settled in Nagorno-Karabakh and eventually eclipsed the local Azerbaijani peasants. Thus, the Azerbaijanis found themselves a minority in their own capital city and in a principal region of the country.<sup>49</sup>

More importantly, economic deprivation tends to exaggerate ethnic turmoil.<sup>50</sup> Thus, recent economic hardships from reduced oil production and other market discrepancies have intensified traditional ethnic rivalries as each group vies for scarce

resources. For example, a chief complaint of the Armenian leadership in Nagorno-Karabakh has been inadequate central Azerbaijani government investment in the regional infrastructure. Another contentious example is average monthly wages. Inexplicably, while agricultural wages did not maintain pace with the national average, industrial and state employees well exceeded the national average. The economic consequences of Russian and Armenian command of these positions was not lost on the Azerbaijanis. Internal ethnic conflict with the Russians, however, does not prevent the Russian state from being Azerbaijan's significantly largest trading partner (see TABLE 12).

#### **4. Social**

There are three social areas that contribute to ethnic friction in Azerbaijan. First, there is a rivalry between the *intelligentsia* elites and the common people (Russian/Armenian versus Azerbaijani). Although there is a resurgence of Azerbaijani intellectualism and cultural heritage, unsurprisingly, Russians and Armenians continue to overshadow this area.<sup>51</sup> This cultural and intellectual conflict is, therefore, essentially between Turkish and European heritages.

Second, the curriculum of public education accentuates Russian influence. Again, Soviet national policy deemphasized native regional cultures in favor of a general *Soviet* one. Soviet culture, however, equalled Russian language and heritage (see TABLE 6).

Finally, there is the manifest religious rivalry within Azerbaijan (see TABLE 3). Although some scholars and leaders deny the importance of religion in the current conflict

over Nagorno-Karabakh, most observers note that there is at least some insidious hint of truth in the allegation.<sup>52</sup>

### C. ETHNIC GROUP GOALS

There are three categories of goals of ethnic groups in Azerbaijan: separatists, ethnocratists and neutrals. Each of these distinct goals translates into significantly different objectives and actions. Although they have diverse national agendas, there is one common theme: *national self-determination*.<sup>53</sup>

#### 1. Separatists

Armenians, particularly in Nagorno-Karabakh, desire political and economic self-determination. As a minimum, the leaders demand a return to autonomy status and at the extreme, annexation to Armenia. Multiple solutions to the political status of Nagorno-Karabakh have been offered by both internal and external Armenian activists groups. For example, the Karabakh Regional Committee, a group of *Russian intelligentsia*, proposed six different options that covered the entire spectrum of choices.<sup>54</sup> Externally, three transnational Armenian nationalist movements, continuing the legacy of the nineteenth century Armenian Revolutionary Movement, issued a joint communique outlining their plan for Nagorno-Karabakh. While the communique was similar to the Karabakh Regional Committee's statement with wide ranging options, this joint communique was unusual for one reason: the three Armenian groups are traditional rivals with extremely different political goals.<sup>55</sup> Once again, the consistent theme was *self-determination* for Nagorno-Karabakh in opposition to both the former USSR and Azerbaijani policies.

## **2. Ethnocratists**

Presently, Azerbaijanis nationalists want to consolidate their power and dominate the state political structure. Having labored under the yoke of Tsarist Russian and then Soviet rule, the majority nation is prepared to take power. This is a typical response following colonialism.<sup>56</sup> Interestingly, one of the stated objectives of the Azerbaijan Popular Front is recognition of Azerbaijani as the official state language.<sup>57</sup> Again, this group of native *intelligentsia* prefers that the indigenous majority nation make decisions, good or bad, rather than a *corporatist* minority. The ethnic minority Russians, on the other hand, want to maintain at least equality in the open and dominance in the shadows.

## **3. Neutrals**

There is no evidence of activism by any of the small Dagestani and Iranian minority nations. Obviously, while they do not desire persecution or discrimination, they will settle for a status quo existence. Considering their small numbers and the degree of continuing assimilation into the majority nation, this is understandable and reasonable.

## **D. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE**

Government response to ethnic competition and strife has been hardest on the Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh, Sumgait, and Baku. As a result of the anti-Armenian *pogroms* initiated by militant Azerbaijanis in February 1988, the Supreme Soviet ordered the Red Army to Azerbaijan. Then in January 1989, possibly as an attempt to suspend discussions on the status of the region, Nagorno-Karabakh was placed under direct rule of the Supreme Soviet. Although eventually civilian rule was returned

to the region, the Armenians were shocked at the Soviet actions. Abandoned by their traditional ally, they had no choice but to turn to the Armenian Republic for support. Since, the Armenian Republic had already formally requested annexation of the territory in June 1988, the political state was extremely sympathetic to the plight of the Armenians in Azerbaijan. After the central Azerbaijan suspended autonomous status for Nagorno-Karabakh in November 1991, the region declared itself a republic. In solidarity, the Armenian Republic demonstrated support by invading Azerbaijan. More than anything, the escalation of violence and praetorian responses to the conflict show the substantial inability of Azerbaijani political institutions to effectively resolve social mobilization problems.<sup>58</sup>

#### **E. CONCLUSIONS**

The answer to ethnic conflict in Azerbaijan clearly rests with Russia. The primary concern for Russia is to secure its southern borders and stop armed violence that threatens regional peace. Because Armenia is economically stronger than Azerbaijan, it has the potential to physically annex Nagorno-Karabakh. However, this would only exacerbate the conflict with Azerbaijan. Therefore, the Russians will exert pressure on the Armenian Republic to ameliorate its territorial claims and allow Russia to negotiate a political settlement between the rival ethnic groups in Azerbaijan.

First, Russia will manipulate a replacement of the Azerbaijan government and substitute it with one with closer ties to Moscow. Second, it will pressure the new regime to allow a territorial referendum to determine the ultimate political status of Nagorno-

Karabakh. As long as this region remains under the political control of Azerbaijan, ethnic strife will continue. Therefore, the answer is to replicate the Nakhichevan solution and cede the territory to Armenia under Russian auspices. Thus, the Russians will ultimately support its historical allies, the Armenians.

#### IV. CASE STUDY: LEBANON

*Beirut.* Modern and grim scenes of contemporary social changes in Lebanon contrast sharply with the bucolic ones from the 1960's. Beirut, the Pearl of the Mediterranean, was an Arab banking and cultural center. While most Arab countries were experiencing upheaval, multiethnic Lebanon appeared stable and secure with its *confessional system* truss. Many foreign observers believed, therefore, that Lebanon was a paradigm of multiethnic accommodation and stability.

The 1943 National Pact articulated in a semi-formalized structure the existing realities of the confessional system. As an important entente and rapprochement between competing Christian and Muslim ethnic groups, the National Pact provided temporary stability and insured representation of all confessional groups. It reinforced in a binding agreement the traditional *zu'ama* and provided peace.

The National Pact, however, was an ethnic conflict Trojan Horse that would erupt thirty years later into a civil war that continues even today. Integral to the intensely violent nature of the 1975 Civil War was the breakdown of central control of the Lebanese Armed Forces. Organized along confessional lines, the Armed Forces reflected the ethnic divisions of the National Pact. Once Lebanon divided into confessional groups, the Armed Forces quickly followed. Thus, the 1975 Lebanese Civil War, the breakdown

of the Armed Forces, and consequent violent ethnic conflict is a direct result of the inflexibility and traditional nature of the 1943 National Pact.

## **A. ETHNIC GROUP IDENTIFICATION**

Four major and distinct groups of people inhabit the modern political state of Lebanon: Christian Lebanese Arabs, Muslim Lebanese Arabs, Armenians, and Palestinian Arabs (see TABLE 15). The two *native* Lebanese groups have fluctuated in relative strength since the official census of 1932 while the Palestinian Arab refugees have steadily increased.<sup>59</sup> In 1932, the Christian Lebanese Arabs were approximately equal to the Muslim Lebanese Arab population. When combined with the Christian Armenians, the combined strength was slightly larger. By 1983, however, the Muslims had slightly surpassed the Christian population (see TABLE 16-18). In consideration of the large Muslim Palestinian refugee population, the differential is significant (see TABLE 19). An analysis of the ethnic determinants of these groups further accents some important societal cleavages and differentials.

### **1. Major Determinants**

#### ***a. Language***

Although it is not the primary ethnic determinant within Lebanon, the general importance of language to ethnic identification cannot be overstated.<sup>60</sup> 93% of the Lebanese population speaks Arabic and it is the primary national language.<sup>61</sup> The other native national language, Armenian, is restricted to that ethnic group. In addition, French is widely spoken by the Maronite *intelligentsia*<sup>62</sup> underscoring their traditional and

close relationship with the former Mandate protectors.<sup>63</sup> Further, the Maronites use Aramaic during religious services and this usage reinforces their sense of distinctiveness. Other non-Arab ethnic minority groups also maintain their native languages. Thus, the first cleavage in Lebanese society is between Arabs and non-Arabs based on language.

**b. Religion**

The single most important and the primary determinant of ethnicity in Lebanon is religion. Religious differences permeate all aspects of Lebanese society dividing the entire state along religious group affiliations. Moreover, these differences are the essential basis of the *confessional system* reinforced in the 1943 National Pact.

Although, many scholars only divide Lebanese society into the Christian and Muslim factions, both religious categories are further subdivided into several nations.<sup>64</sup> This differentiation is important since it highlights the extremely complex nature of Lebanese society. It also points out the fractionalization potential that serves as an organizing factor for *secular* political mobilization.

Within the Christian Community, there are three primary groups divided by *rites*: Maronite, Orthodox, and Catholic. The Maronite rites further strengthen that ethnic group's identity while the other two rites divide common nationalities. Similarly, the Muslim community is divided into three *sects*: Sunni, Shi'ia, and Druze. While the Sunni and Shi'ia sects are found throughout the Arab world, the Druze are indigenous to the Levant. An offshoot of *Isma'ilyya*, the Druze are considered heretical within the Muslim

community, reinforcing their collective identity. The Palestinian refugees, on the other hand, are predominantly Sunni.

## **2. Minor Determinants**

The minor determinants of geography, culture, history, and economy contribute to the division of Lebanese society. First, Lebanon is divided into two mountainous regions, a coastal plain, and an interior valley. Each of these areas has an associated ethnic group. Maronites along with the Orthodox and Catholic communities dominate the central coastal plain, East Beirut, and the Western slopes of Mount Lebanon. This central location grants the Christians greater access to seat of power in Beirut. This geographical distribution was extremely important during the French occupation and reinforced the special status of the Christian community.

The Muslim community, on the other hand is spread around the periphery of Lebanon. While the Sunni sect is concentrated in the north around Tripoli, there is a significant presence in West Beirut. The Shi'ia dominate the Biqa valley, South Beirut, and the southern Lebanese plain along the Litani River. The Druze are divided between the southern mountainous western slopes of both the Mount Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon Ranges. Like the Shi'ia, the Palestinian refugees have spread from the Biqa valley to the Mediterranean Coast and the Litani River area.

Kinship and the extended family are the basic unit of Lebanese society.<sup>65</sup> Primary linkage between individuals and society is through the blood line and directly associated with the traditional *zu'ama*. Lebanon's economic system also reinforces kinship

lines since most business is family run. A young entrepreneur must either receive formal permission to venture beyond the family business or completely dedicate themselves to its development.

## **B. SOURCES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT**

### **1. Historical Perspective**

#### **a. General**

Like Azerbaijan, history has not been kind to Lebanon. Conquest and domination have strongly influenced intergroup relations as competing states fought to control the fertile fruited valleys of Mount Lebanon. Successive waves of Muslims and Christian conquerors have dominated Lebanon leaving lasting political, economic, and social marks on the modern state.

The legacy of the *politics of domination*<sup>66</sup> is resentment over the outside influence of competing states within Lebanon. Two decades of civil unrest in Lebanon is punctuated by successive interference or invasions by both Syria and Israel. This external intrusion into the internal affairs of Lebanon has been characterized by bolstering sectarian disagreements and tensions. In particular, the radicalized Palestinian problem of southern Lebanon and Israel's subsequent violent activities there, fractionalized the previous fragile political alliances between the Christians and Muslims. Therefore, while the 1943 National Pact established the inflexible preconditions for eventual violent ethnic conflict, radicalized and mobilized Palestinians coupled with *foreign influences* provided the ultimate catalyst.<sup>67</sup>

### ***b. The 1975 Civil War***

In April 1975, civil war erupted in Lebanon following a fatal occurrence in a Beirut suburb. Kata'ib militiamen ambushed and massacred 27 Palestinians in a bus and the incident inflamed ethnic communities throughout all of Lebanon. Prior tensions were already high in Lebanon based on traditional political patronage by the President, Sulayman Franjeh, who alienated Maronites and Muslims alike. Similarly, the military had ended any possibility of neutrality when it used armed force to stop a Muslim demonstration following the assassination of the Mayor of Sidon. Although it is very normal to use the military to stop rioting, this act was widely viewed as a sectarian conflict between a Christian military and Muslim population. All these incidents conspired to plunge Lebanon into two decades of civil war and ethnic conflict.<sup>68</sup>

### **2. Political**

The 1943 Lebanon National Pact is the twin-headed serpent that has shaped political life there for five decades.<sup>69</sup> On the one hand, the National Pact protects the different ethnic groups and insures that they have representation in the government. On the other hand, it is politics of dominance, patronage, and *za'im* notables. At the root of domination is the inherent descending scale of political power that the National Pact contains.<sup>70</sup>

The traditional style of Lebanese politics, established on strict ethnic sectarian lines, virtually insured that there would develop a crisis. Traditionally, notables within a confessional group control all political activity.<sup>71</sup> As the pan-Arabist movement rose

in the 1960's within the Middle East, pressure on the traditional *zu'ama* political distribution system increased since the new movement appealed to mass, popular political participation. Moreover, as a mass movement, it was a direct threat to the established hierarchical notables, formalized by the Lebanese National Pact, which controlled political power. The inflexible proportional representation aspect of the 1943 National Pact could not accommodate direct participation in political activities, especially by unenfranchised Palestinians.

Further politicization of the Palestinians and threat to the *zu'ama* occurred with the 1969 Cairo Accord.<sup>72</sup> This agreement granted an independent status to the Palestinians and the PLO, isolating them from the remainder of Lebanese society. Since the PLO was not considered in the 1943 National Pact, their political independence challenged the traditional representative notables. Eventually, the PLO cross border raids into Israel prompted two Israeli invasions that sustained the ongoing Christian-Muslim Civil War.<sup>73</sup>

### 3. Economic

The wealth of Lebanon was established by Maronite and Druze entrepreneurs with a longtime *resident* Palestinians. Leaving the Sunni and Shi'ia out of the economic development in Lebanon was an obvious but understandable mistake. Like many other Middle Eastern cities, Beirut, Tripoli, and Tyre became magnets for the rural poor in the 1950's. *Bidonvilles* of slums encircled the major cities with disaffected youths and urban poor.

The Lebanese Sunni and Shi'ia ethnic groups were disproportionately represented in the economic deprivation of the *Bidonvilles*. The arrival of Palestinian refugees after both the 1948 and the 1967 Arab-Israeli wars increased the pressure on the limited slum services available and employment. This situation became explosive when Jordan attacked Palestinian guerrillas in 1970 and drove them into Lebanon. This resurgent wave of refugees, associated with the PLO, was radical and mobilized the slum dwellers.<sup>74</sup>

#### 4. Social

Despite economic discrepancies Lebanese society is loosely horizontally stratified. Potentially, all ethnic groups are represented along the entire spectrum of social class and no one ethnic group is considered inherently or sublimely above another. However, the reality is that the legacy of the close relationship between the French left the Maronites disproportionately represented in the upper levels of society. This contrasts sharply with the elevated status that the Sunni enjoyed during the Ottoman occupation. The reversal of social status between the Maronites and Sunni was slightly mitigated by the 1943 National Pact. However, it remains a source of social antagonism.

To further complicate religious tensions, the pan-Arab mass movement, rejecting the West, was closely linked to Islamic faith and the Palestinians.<sup>75</sup> Despite the 1943 National Pact and constitutional guarantees of religious freedom, this emphasis on Islam represented an indirect threat to the Lebanese Christian community.<sup>76</sup> When combined with a movement to replace the established order of confessional notables, the tensions were unbearable and two decades of civil war and unrest followed.

## **C. ETHNIC GROUP GOALS**

### **1. Separatist**

A minority of fundamental Maronites would like to return to an idealized Mount Lebanon.<sup>77</sup> The continuing pressure of modern political mobilization of competing Muslim groups, challenges the traditional values and political system of these ultraconservative Maronites. Their proposed solution, is a separate traditional Christian state located in the historical Mount Lebanon geographical area.

### **2. Integrationist**

The Palestinian movement is largely integrationist. Their stated political goal is to correct the Palestinian diaspora. According to Palestinian leaders, especially the PLO, The solution is to establish a political Palestinian state convergent with or at least located in the modern state of Israel.<sup>78</sup> Oddly, this integrationist movement that would remove the refugees from Lebanon, has only tacit support from the Lebanese government other than periodically perfunctory solidarity announcements calling for Israeli-Palestinian settlement.

### **3. Ethnocratist**

Both the mainstream Christian and Muslim sectarian movements are ethnocratic. The Maronites want to retain their domination of the political system according to the 1943 National Pact. Both the Sunni and Shi'ia ethnic groups want equality in the political system as a minimum and dominance in the end.

## D. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

### 1. The Lebanese Armed Forces and the Militias

There is no internal functional central government in Lebanon today.<sup>79</sup> The legislature and government elected in 1972 have either been extended or the seats allowed to go unfilled. Instead, the country is divided into two armed camps along sectarian lines. *The Lebanese Front* (Maronite) and *The National Movement* (Sunni/Shi'ia/Druze) (see TABLE 20).<sup>80</sup> Other armed factions also exist but fall within the influence of the two major antagonists.<sup>81</sup> This bifurcation of Lebanon has created mini-ethnic states with accompanying militia and external sponsors.

The genesis of the breakdown of central government control of armed violence is deeply rooted in the Lebanese confessional system. Instead of performing an integrating function as Samuel Huntington often suggests is the role of the military, the Lebanese Armed Forces has always been organized based on ethnic affiliations (see TABLE 21). When the Lebanese Army began fighting Palestinian forces in southern Lebanon in 1969, the ethnic tensions increased dramatically, especially in the Muslim organized units.<sup>82</sup> After four years of fighting the PLO militias, however, the amateurish Lebanese Army was exhausted and conceded defeat - it could not control the PLO.<sup>83</sup>

With the Lebanese Army emotionally and militarily defeated by PLO militiamen, the seeds were sown for further disintegration along ethnic affiliations. When ethnic riots erupted in early 1975, the demoralized Lebanese Army was called out to quell the armed clashes between ethnic groups. This final assault on the ethnically charged Lebanese

Army proved too much for many new recruits and Maronite soldiers began to fight Muslim ones.<sup>84</sup>

Perhaps trying to maintain control over the fractionalized Lebanese Armed Forces, President Franjeh appointed a military cabinet in May 1975. Unfortunately, this military cabinet reflected traditional confessional loyalties despite its superficial military neutrality. After only two days, the military cabinet resigned and sectarian armed violence began in earnest as entire Lebanese Army units disappeared or affiliated themselves with ethnic militias.<sup>85</sup>

As if as a cruel joke of history, the reorganization and reconstitution of the Lebanese Army in 1982 again followed ethnic affiliations. Trained and equipped by France and the United States, the new Lebanese Army may be expected to be a modern integrated force. This expectation is further bolstered by the implementation of a universal conscription system. However, as long as the Lebanese Army represents sectarian divisions, it is doubtful that the soldiers could ever remain neutral in any future ethnically charged combat situations.

## **2. Government Strategies**

As these mini-ethnic states competed with one another for control of physical territory in Lebanon, there was a shift from a government *strategy of accommodation* (consensus and compromise) to a *strategy of containment* (repression). Instead of allowing for and respecting religious, sectarian differences, they became a focal point for ethnic chauvinism, mostly by the Maronite-dominated government. The net effect was

that the Maronites continued to suppress the Muslim attempts to reorder the internal balance of power. This political power stemmed from the Maronite's ability to control events and suppress opposition with authority derived from the 1943 National Pact. Again, the National Pact created the preconditions that allowed the 1975 Civil War to erupt.

## E. CONCLUSIONS

The legacy of ethnic conflict in Lebanon is one of competition, dominance, compromise, and consensus. Druze feudalism gave way to Maronite hegemony. Maronite political dominance required compromises with the Sunni. Today, a new consensus and a *new deal* are required to account for the importance of the Shi'ia. However, any new political system must not repeat the strict and binding inflexibility of the 1943 National Pact.

There are three components to the solution to two decades of armed ethnic violence in Lebanon. First, the Palestinian refugee problem must be resolved. As long as militant Palestinians remain in Lebanon, Israel will continue to occupy a southern Lebanon Security Zone. This occupation exacerbates the tension between the Maronite Christian dominated government and Sunni Muslims who feel solidarity with the Palestinians. The resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over the West Bank and Gaza Strip is *the* answer to Lebanon's Palestinian problem.<sup>86</sup> Once Palestinians gain some political control of these areas, there will be no reason for Palestinian refugees to remain in Lebanon. Similarly, the *raison d'ete* for armed militant Palestinians will be eliminated. The removal

from Lebanon of the Palestinians, especially the radical elements, will reduce the ethnic tension between the Maronites and Sunnis.

Second, the Lebanese Armed Forces must be integrated. Continued reliance on confessional based units only portends a repeat of the 1975 Civil War tragedy of desertions when faced with ethnic tensions. Further, this integration, coupled with universal conscription could forge a true sense of Lebanese nationalism vice traditional confessional loyalties among present and future military recruits.

Third, the political structure of Lebanese government must recognize the importance of the Shi'ia. Lebanon's confessional system requires a consensus. The 1943 Arab National Pact must be revisited with a new consensus established that reflects current demographics and ethnic group realities. The Maronite Christian fears that a Muslim coalition will unfairly treat their interests must be assuaged. Peace is possible in Lebanon by returning to the traditional conflict resolution methods that the competing Lebanese ethnic groups originally employed: cooperation, compromise, and consensus. In other words, the Lebanese must return to a *strategy of accommodation*.

## V. CASE STUDY: NICARAGUA

*Contras*. While a great deal has been written about the anti-Sandinista movement in Nicaragua, very little deals with the ethnic dimensions of the struggle. The bifurcated struggle on the West and East coast of Nicaragua represented two distinct movements despite their common designation in news reports. The Western movement was mostly a political struggle; the Eastern movement was a struggle over ethnic freedom for the Indians.

### A. ETHNIC GROUP IDENTIFICATION

#### 1. Major Determinants

There are four major *genuses* of peoples that inhabit the modern political state of Nicaragua: *Mestizo* or *Landino*, *Indian*, *Creole* or *Blacks*, and *White* (see TABLE 22).<sup>87</sup> Within the general Indian designation, four nations live within the state of Nicaragua. The most numerous and widespread are the Miskito comprising approximately fifty percent of the Indian population. The Rama and Sumo are equally divided at twenty percent for each nation. Lastly, the smallest nation, the Garifona, constitutes only about ten percent of the total Indian population. An analysis of the ethnic determinants of all the distinguishable ethnic groups accents some important societal cleavages and differentials.

**a. Language**

There are three predominate languages in Nicaragua: Spanish, English, and Miskito. These three languages reinforce the general identities of the ethnic groups and differentiate them. Interestingly, the Whites share both Spanish and English about equally depending on the region that they live in.

Spanish is the official state language as well as that of the Mestizo.<sup>88</sup> This predominate status reflects the Spanish conquest and consequent domination of Nicaragua. Conversely, the next largest language group is English reflecting British occupation and subjugation of the Atlantic Coast. Finally, the only *native* language, Miskito, is the primary language spoken by three of the Indian nations. However, these nations also have a bilingual knowledge of English (majority) or Spanish (minority).

**b. Religion**

Religious differences further reinforce the language cleavages. The Spanish speaking Mestizo are nearly one hundred percent Roman Catholic representing the largest religious group in Nicaragua. Approximately half the Whites are also Roman Catholic. The Protestant Moravian Church is the next largest category and is the primary religion of the Indians, Creole, and the remaining Whites. Again, the religious divisions in Nicaragua are directly attributable to Spanish and British influences on the Pacific and Atlantic Coasts.

**c. Genetics<sup>89</sup>**

Skin color, body type, and facial features are the most visible symbols of ethnic group affiliation. Classification of ethnic groups based on distinctive genetics can range from biological to legal definitions. Like language and religion, common genetic features tend to promote affinity within an ethnic group.

The most visible division of Nicaraguan society is skin color. This genetic characteristic graduates from darkest to lightest beginning with the Blacks, Creole, Indians, Mestizo, to the Whites. Although there are no *racial laws* designating ethnic groups by skin color as in South Africa, somatic differences prevail. The genetic make up of Nicaragua is not only important to ethnic group identification and but also social status. This distinction is discussed in more detail below.

**2. Minor Determinants**

The minor determinants of geography, culture, history, and economy contribute to the division of Nicaraguan society. These minor determinants of ethnicity correlate amazingly with the major determinants and harden the four categories.

**a. Geography**

There are three distinct geographic regions in Nicaragua: Pacific Coast, Central Highlands, and Atlantic Coast.<sup>90</sup> Generally, however, most observers of Nicaraguan society divide it into either the Pacific (majority population) and Atlantic Coasts (minority population) or Western and Eastern societies. Since the Central Highlands are indistinguishably linked to the western part of the country, this study will

also divide Nicaragua in half. The true importance of the Central Highlands is the dividing effect they produce in Nicaragua.

Unfortunately, the Atlantic Coast has never been effectively integrated into the majority Pacific Coast society. Until recently, there was not even a road or rail link between the coasts. Mostly, communication networks between the two coasts were either by sea or air.<sup>91</sup> This division reinforced and exacerbated the major ethnic determinants listed above as the two distinct societies developed independently.

Finally, another important aspect of this geographic division is closely associated urban to rural relationship. The Pacific Coast population is predominantly urban and centered on the capitol city, Managua. On the Atlantic Coast there are some urban centers but the population is decidedly rural.

#### ***b. History***

Not surprisingly, the bifurcated historical development of the Nicaraguan Pacific and Atlantic Coasts is extremely divergent.<sup>92</sup> While the Pacific Coast aligned itself with Roman Catholic, Spanish speaking, Spain, the Atlantic Coast *costenos* linked themselves with Protestant, English speaking, Britain and the Caribbean. Without a proper appreciation for this historical alignment and separate development of the opposing coasts, the ethnic strife seems mysterious and imponderable.<sup>93</sup>

#### ***c. Economy***

The economic factor of ethnicity is relevant mostly on the Atlantic Coast. There, employment and ethnic groups combine and reinforce each other. On the one

hand, the Atlantic Coast Indians engage mainly in traditional resource extractive occupations such as agriculture and mining. On the other hand, the urban-centered Creoles are known for their merchant abilities and occupied the middle class positions. Finally, Whites and Mestizos own most of the larger exportive businesses and dominate governmental bureaucratic positions. Thus, economic occupations alone do not define the ethnic groups but merely assist in adding further definition to identities.

## **B. SOURCES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT<sup>94</sup>**

### **1. Historical Perspective**

To understand the roots of ethnic conflict in Nicaragua, we must examine and understand the historical development and experience of the region. As alluded to in the discussion above, the dual nature of Nicaraguan society is the result of the divergent history of the Pacific and Atlantic Coasts. Separated by different historical developments yet unnaturally joined in a political union of a single state, the two regions remained peaceful when they did not interact. The benign neglect of the Somoza regime maintained the reality of two regions. When the Sandinistas came to power in 1979, however, the historical neglect suddenly ended. Thus, the stage was set for the latent ethnic hostilities between the West and East to emerge.<sup>95</sup>

Within this historical context it is important to understand that the Sandinistas were Marxist. Their ideological beliefs and practical application of Marxism formed the basis of the political, social, and economic sources of ethnic conflict.<sup>96</sup> In all three areas, the

confrontation between the Pacific Coast Sandinista central government and the Atlantic Coast minority ethnic groups resulted in resentment, hostility, and eventual rebellion.

## **2. Political**

Under Somoza, the Atlantic Coast was never integrated into mainstream Nicaraguan political life.<sup>97</sup> While, conventional wisdom would say this was a source of conflict, just the opposite was true. In fact, since there was no interference with commercial activities, the Atlantic Coast residents were content to remain aloof from the intrigue that surrounded the central government.<sup>98</sup>

With the end of the Somoza regime in 1979, the newly installed Sandinista regime took active measures to end the sleepy independence of the East.<sup>99</sup> To facilitate their integrative goals<sup>100</sup>, the Sandinistas outlawed the existing Indian organization ALPROMISU<sup>101</sup> and established a new political action organization, MISURASATA.<sup>102</sup> Nearly from MISURASATA's inception, Stedman Fagoth led this Indian-oriented, Sandinista-inspired umbrella association. To further the Sandinistas' attempts to gain control of the East, they installed Fagoth on a central government planning committee, The Council of Government.<sup>103</sup>

Initially, the relationship of MISURASATA with the central government prospered.<sup>104</sup> However, Fagoth eventually became disillusioned with the Sandinistas as their pervading attempts to control Nicaraguan society unfolded into actions. By 1981, the true intentions of the Sandinistas revealed themselves as the central government increasingly collectivized the Atlantic Coast agricultural production. Eventually tiring of

the militant resistance by Fagoth and other MISURASATA leaders, the Sandinistas imprisoned them in February 1981 and outlawed the organization.<sup>105</sup> This disenfranchisement eliminated the last legal political ethnic minority organization of the ethnic minorities. After Fagoth won his release from prison, open Indian confrontation with the Sandinistas began. Instead of any further cooperation with the central government, Fagoth formed an illegal alternative organization, MISURA,<sup>106</sup> to oppose politically and militarily the Sandinistas' violation of Atlantic Coast Indian autonomy.

### **3. Social**

There were three interconnected social factor sources of ethnic conflict in Nicaragua. First, the Sandinistas threatened the very fabric of the Indian and Creole society. The central government undertook a deliberate program to assimilate forcibly the ethnic minorities. This program included changes in education and medical services.<sup>107</sup> Before the Nicaraguan revolution, Moravian Church organizations provided most of these services. In particular, school curriculums were taught in native languages. However, the Sandinistas rejected this arrangement, secularized education, and introduced Spanish speaking Cuban teachers.<sup>108</sup> Moreover, Moravian Church clinics were closed and mostly not replaced with central government resources. This restriction of access to medical services not only secularized medical care but also threatened the basic health care availability for the Atlantic Coast minority ethnic groups.

Second, Mestizo administrators from the Pacific Coast replaced traditional village Council of Elders.<sup>109</sup> While this was primarily a political action, there was also a social

component. The respect for the traditional life styles of the Indians and Creoles were replaced by new, *progressive* dictums from the central government.

Third, Nicaragua, West and East, has always been a stratified society.<sup>110</sup> In the West, this stratification was socio-economic. In the East, however, the stratification was vertical based on ethnicity.<sup>111</sup> Whites and Europeans were at the top of the social order followed by the Indians (Miskitos being the largest group were ranked highest) and then Blacks. The Mestizos were considered the lowest ethnic group in this rank order social system. Thus, when the Sandinistas placed Mestizo administrators in positions of power above all the other ethnic groups, there was a dynamic contradiction to the existing order. While the Whites and Europeans grudgingly accepted this change, the Indians and Creoles flatly rejected the *new order*.

#### **4. Economic**

As discussed in ethnic group identification above, the Atlantic Coast Indians Creoles were a traditional society. They did not dependent on a cash economy and preferred the simpler system of trade and small subsistence farming. The Sandinistas challenged this traditional economic arrangement with forced collectivization of farming and introduction of wage labor.<sup>112</sup> Deprived of their traditional livelihoods, the Indians and Creoles felt threatened with extinction.<sup>113</sup>

### **C. ETHNIC GROUP GOALS**

#### **1. Separatists**

Clearly, the Indians and Creoles' goals were a return to the autonomy that they

had enjoyed under the Somoza regime.<sup>114</sup> The pervasive intrusion by the Sandinistas into their independent cultures caused these two groups to rebel. To regain autonomy by armed violence, Stedman Fagoth recruited approximately 3,000 Indians to join the northern Contra group FDN<sup>115</sup> operating from bases in Honduras.<sup>116</sup> In the south, Eden Pastora recruited approximately 1,500 Indians and Creoles and formed another armed resistance group, ARDE,<sup>117</sup> operating from bases in Costa Rica. Both groups had a single goal: *remove Sandinista interference in the affairs of the Atlantic Coast and achieve national self-determination.*<sup>118</sup>

## **2. Ethnocratists**

The Sandinistas and their Atlantic Coast Mestizo supporter were ethnocratists. Their obvious goal was to consolidate power and dominate the entire spectrum of Eastern society. Importantly, this *politics of domination*<sup>119</sup> had a dual thrust. For the Sandinistas it was merely an attempt to capture and control the mineral resources of the East. For the Atlantic Coast Mestizos, it was an imposition of a new order that benefited them at the Indian and Creole expense.

## **D. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE**

Central government responses to the ethnic minority separatist movements progressed in three phases. In February 1981 the Sandinistas launched Phase One with a campaign of terror and repression against the Miskito Indians. Citing security requirements, government militia<sup>120</sup> along with some regular soldiers raided several villages to eliminate the rebel support bases. The raids by the militia were extremely brutal and prompted

several international human rights investigations.<sup>121</sup>

Following a modified *Malaysian Solution*, Phase Two began in January 1982. Again citing internal security reasons, the Sandinista government evacuated Indian villages along the *Rio Coco* before a large, organized, armed resistance movement could develop.<sup>122</sup> Several crowded relocation camps were established in the Indian region and villagers were forcibly required to live there and work Sandinista farms.<sup>123</sup> Anyone who resisted resettlement was labeled a *counter-revolutionary* and imprisoned or killed. This aided the *contra* propoganda and further alienated the general Indian population from the Sandinista government.<sup>124</sup>

While Phase One and Two continued splendidly, the armed resistance movements had a remarkable effect on the Sandinista government. Quietly in 1985, the Interior Minister, Tomas Borge, initiated Phase Three. Negotiating with Indian leaders, Borge reached a tentative settlement of the armed struggle that recognized *some errors had been made* by the Sandinistas. This agreement also recognized the inalienable rights of the Indians, official recognition of their ethnic identity, and limited autonomy. Thus, the Atlantic Coast gained its objectives in 1986 and continues in a limited autonomous status in the political state of Nicaragua.

## E. CONCLUSIONS

The ethnic conflict component of the Nicaraguan counterrevolution is often overlooked by most observers. The predominate attention and analysis focused on the sponsorship and role of the United States' support for *Contras* operating from bases in

western Honduras (FDN). Although some attention occasionally turned to the ARDE operating from Costa Rica and FDN elements from eastern Honduras, it was mostly cursory. Like the West-East division of Nicaraguan society, these two interrelated counterrevolutionary movements were distinct. Without an understanding of the ethnic dimension of the eastern conflict, this subtle difference is lost in the overwhelming emphasis on the western conflict. Not only were the political goals different but also were the ethnic groups.

Indeed, the political aspirations of the two groups reflected the national aspirations of Nicaragua. Eventually, the Sandinista-dominated government realized these differences and resolved them with the political reality of contemporary Nicaragua. Today, there is a tentative equality between the Mestizo groups in the west and autonomy for the Indian-dominated minority group in the east.

This balance of national aspirations must be maintained or the central government of Nicaragua risks renewed escalation and widening of the current political conflict. The current rebellious actions of hostage taking and armed violence in the West do not affect or involve the eastern society. As long as the central government faithfully allows some degree of autonomy for the Miskito and other Indian nations, the Indians will remain neutral to the political struggle for control of the central government. If, however, radical Sandinista elements regain control of the government in Managua and reinstate previous domination policies, the Atlantic Coast will rearm and resist. Considering the ideology of the Sandinistas and their historical record toward the Eastern Society, new ethnic

conflict can only be avoided by a *democratic* balance within the central government that continues to respect the existing autonomy of the Atlantic Coast.

## VI. DETERRENCE, COMPELLENCE, AND CRISIS

### MANAGEMENT

#### A. THEORETICAL BASIS

As indicated earlier, any analysis of how governments respond to ethnic conflict must be divided into at least two levels: the international system and state level. There is, however, several immediate difficulties with using current prevalent crisis management theories and levels of analysis.<sup>125</sup> First, ethnic groups are non-state actors. Although at times they are organized, control territory, and display some of the common traits of a state, ethnic groups are seldom recognized by the international community as having state status.<sup>126</sup> At the international system level (Waltz's Third Image), crisis management theory is predominantly rooted in structural neorealism theory that does not accept the concept of non-state actors.<sup>127</sup> Essentially, this approach states that the international system will dictate the actions of states *vis-a-vis* each other.<sup>128</sup> It does not account for how the international system affects sub-state ethnic groups, particularly transnational ones that transcend traditional state boundaries.

Second, arguments concerning deterrence and compellence are almost entirely based on structural neorealism theory.<sup>129</sup> States deter other states but only against territorial aggression. These arguments do not consider the interplay of ethnic groups in conflict at either the international or state level (Waltz's Second Image<sup>130</sup>).

Third, although reductionist theory does account for non-state actors, it generally discusses institutions of government and bureaucratic politics rather than sub-state ethnic groups.<sup>131</sup> Moreover, transnational ethnic groups further complicate state level analysis since they are not contained within a single state boundary. Therefore it is difficult to determine which state actually has the predominant influence on a transnational ethnic group's behavior.

Setting aside the inherent contradictions in these theories as they relate to ethnic groups and ethnic conflict, it is possible to conduct analysis using the basic tools of the theories. This hybrid approach begins with the assumption that ethnic groups can be treated as if they were a state. Although the political leaders of ethnic groups only have loose control over their constituency, in general, ethnic groups do behave collectively to achieve definable political goals. The earlier discussion of ethnic group goals outlined the territorial nature that these objectives often include. Therefore, it is completely appropriate to interpret ethnic conflict as state on state action within an international context. Thus, at the international level, deterrence theory gives us some insight into state actions relative to ethnic conflict. Thus, a combination of deterrence and political ethnicity theory provides a more robust framework for conflict analysis that transcends from the state to the international level.

## **B. DETERRENCE**

### **1. Extended-General Deterrence**

Huth describes extended-general deterrence as a condition where a defender

prepares for an armed attack against a protege, even when there is no immediate threat.<sup>132</sup> During the Cold War, there was a global extended-general deterrence to ethnic conflict. This does not suggest that there were no instances of this type of conflict since there were several obvious ones in Lebanon and other states. However, compared to the explosion of ethnic conflict in the Post Cold War period, there were relatively few. The basis of this deterrence was the struggle between the United States and The Former Soviet Union to control world events. Thus, regional disputes, including ethnically based ones, were ideological battle grounds between the two super powers. Especially the Former Soviet Union actively suppressed nationalism both within its own borders and within its regional allies. With the end of The Cold War, suppression of their simmering nationalism abruptly stopped.

There are two factors that account for this exponential growth in national consciousness and the suspension of extended-general deterrence. First, the demise of the former Soviet Union signaled the end of an era of purposeful suppression of selected national identities.<sup>133</sup> The Soviets consciously and conspicuously manipulated ethnic groups to achieve their political objectives not only within the USSR but also within their sphere of influence. Other Communist-inspired governments also recognized the inherent theoretical conflict between Marxism and nationalism. Thus, while many ethnic groups were beginning to develop a sense of national identity at the beginning of the twentieth century, others groups were suppressed.

Second, the new normative strategy of "Democratic Enlargement" that currently shapes the foreign policy of The United States encourages national movements. Formerly suppressed nationalities interpret the often quoted United States' ideals of democracy and self-determination quite literally as promotion of their political objectives to shape *A New World Order*. Encouraged by these ideological ideals and the history of the United States defending similar movements during The Cold War, many nations seek self-determination.<sup>134</sup> However, as with any normative ideal, "Democratic Enlargement" suffers from a lack of consensus and common definition on the exact meaning of *Democracy*.

## 2. Extended-Immediate Deterrence

During the Cold War, there were several examples of extended-immediate deterrence in ethnic conflicts. The three case studies discussed earlier are summarized below.

### Extended-Immediate Deterrence

Country	Defender	Protege	Attacker
<i>Azerbaijan</i>	Armenia	Armenians	Azerbaijanis
<i>Lebanon</i>	US, France, Syria, Israel	Maronite Christians	Muslims
	Syria	Muslims	Israel
	US	PLO	Israel
<i>Nicaragua</i>	US	Miskito Indians	Sandinistas

In each of these three examples, an ethnic group (or representative such as the PLO) under attack, was defended by either the threat of the use of force or actual introduction of combat forces. The defenders' objectives were to restore peace in favor of the besieged ethnic group.

### **3. Strategies of Accommodation**

At the state level of analysis, strategies of accommodation are very similar to deterrence yet subtly different. The central government attempts to deter armed violence by an ethnic group through conciliation and negotiated settlements instead of the threat of violence. However, since the ethnic group is nearly always the weaker party, there is still an implied threat. Nonetheless, this strategy is particularly effective at diffusing violent ethnic conflict since it concedes to the political (and often socio-economic) goals of the rebelling ethnic groups. Thus, the state under siege by an ethnic uprising *defends* itself through artful negotiations.

## **C. COMPELLENCE**

### **1. General**

The obverse of deterrence is compellence. Once general or even immediate deterrence fails, the international system takes measures to compel conflict resolution in ethnic conflict. Although the methods may not always be appropriate, some action is initiated. The best contemporary example is the Balkan conflict. Any number of international collective organizations are attempting to resolve the ethnic conflict in Bosnia through the threat of and actual use of force.

## **2. Strategies of Containment**

Strategies of containment are state level actions designed to enforce behavior modification. Ethnic groups are coerced into acceptable actions through punishment. This is brutal power in a raw form. However, as stated earlier, the survival instinct is extremely powerful and the net effect of excessive suppression is a prolongation of ethnic conflict rather than early termination.

## **D. CRISIS MANAGEMENT**

### **1. General**

Ethnic conflict is obviously not always violent. Within a multi-ethnic society, political, social, and economic competition along ethnic lines can proceed peacefully. However, a catalytic event can quickly transform *peacetime competition* into armed violence. During the Cold War, the eruption of ethnic-based armed violence signaled the failure of extended-general deterrence and the beginning of a crisis.

### **2. Crisis Bargaining Codes**

J. Philip Rogers' discussion of crisis bargaining codes is extremely appropriate for ethnic conflict.<sup>135</sup> The entire point of his argument is that, in a crisis, leaders have different *operational codes* that drive their behavior. The same is true between ethnic groups because of the cultural basis of their operational codes. As each group attempts to deter or compel, negotiate or coerce, ethnic biases shape the parameters of their behavior. The potential for misperception is obvious and all too often comes to fruition.<sup>136</sup>

## **E. CONCLUSIONS**

Ethnic conflict *is* social revolution but in a much more dangerous and virulent form. Ethnic groups engaged in revolution invoke many government responses at both the state and international level. While accommodation seems to have utility (as seen in Nicaragua), containment generally exacerbates the conflict. At the international level, extended deterrence tends to prolong a conflict especially when combined with a government program of containment as we have seen in Azerbaijan and Lebanon.

Clearly, the policy prescription for the United States in the Post Cold War period is to let regional conflicts take care of themselves. General deterrence failed in the peripheral areas during the Cold war and is meaningless in the contemporary setting. Immediate deterrence accelerated conflict and increased or prolonged the level of violence. Neither outcome is desirable.

## VII. CONCLUSIONS

Ethnic groups are not necessarily political. While an ethnic group may have a sense of a unique identity, it does not necessarily follow that there will be an associated violent ethnic movement. Indeed, there may be no movement at all except assimilation into a dominant ethnic group culture. Threatening government actions, however, tend to evoke a negative reaction. The effort of governments to suppress forcibly ethnic unrest assists ethnic and communal leaders in their attempts to transform subliminal ethnic identity into an operational one. This political aspect of ethnicity is the basis of the political ethnicity paradigm.

Political ethnicity theory is a hybrid of both conflict analysis and descriptive theories. This synthetic blend provides a comprehensive picture and illustrates the vast range of dynamic variables that ethnic conflicts revolve around. In summary, political ethnicity theory explains ethnic conflict using a combination of the other theories with ethnicity as a skeletal basis. The four components of political ethnicity theory (ethnic group identification, sources of ethnic conflict, ethnic group goals, and government responses )is a systematic approach to this contemporary issue. Each of the three case studies illustrates the practical application of political ethnicity theory to contemporary ethnic conflicts and leads to four primary conclusions.

First, the presence of transnational ethnic groups faced with repressive government actions increases the level of ethnic conflict. In each of the case studies, the most violent

ethnic minority was one that was also transnational. This is not surprising since these groups have an outside source of support to reinforce their actions against a harsh and repressive regime.

Second, horizontally stratified societies exacerbate inherent societal inequities. This tension increases violence when coupled with other sources of ethnic conflict but is not a primary cause of ethnic-based turmoil.

Third, government strategies towards ethnic groups do make a difference. As the case studies effectively illustrate, violent ethnic conflict is mostly associated with strategies of containment. As governments attempt to repress ethnic group demands for political, social, and economic power, ethnic identity is reified. Ethnic group and communal leaders are then able to translate this primordial ethnic identity into an effective operational ethnic identity in opposition to the government. While it is certainly true that strong central governments can effectively restrain ethnic conflict with overwhelming application of force, this strategy of containment is a short term solution that eventually leads to increased violence.

Strategies of accommodation, on the other hand, allow for political, social, and economic freedom of minority ethnic groups. These expressions tend to be peaceful and less threatening to a central government as political, social, and economic power is *shared* between competing ethnic groups. Thus, the basis of ethnic conflict is transmuted and diffused, eliminating the support base of ethnic and communal leaders. The overall result is that with the loss of their ethnic constituency and *raison d'ete* for ethnic-based strife,

the inherent tensions of society are reduced to a manageable level of conflict. Therefore, strategies of accommodation are long term solutions to ethnic conflict since they significantly reduce the level of violence.

Although there are numerous other examples of terminated or ongoing ethnic conflicts, Azerbaijan, Lebanon, and Nicaragua are excellent illustrative case studies that support the three conclusions above. These three examples show a blend of ethnic conflict factors with differing results. These results are summarized in the table below.

### Ethnic Conflict Summary

<b>State</b>	<b>Primary Ethnic Identifier</b>	<b>Trans-national Ethnic Group</b>	<b>Government Strategy Pattern</b>	<b>Stratification</b>	<b>Conflict Termination (1994)</b>
<i>Azerbaijan</i>	Language	Yes	C - A - C	Mixed Vertical	No
<i>Lebanon</i>	Religion	Yes	A - C	Mixed Vertical	No
<i>Nicaragua</i>	Genetics	No	A - C - A	Horizontal	Yes

Fourth, with the end of the Cold War, violent conflicts in general have become increasingly more regional in nature. Despite the horrible atrocities associated with ethnic conflicts, they do not always require intervention from states outside the affected region. Indeed, foreign involvement tends to increase the level of violence rather than mitigate or terminate it. As with any civil war, ethnic conflicts end when one of three events occurs: one belligerent party wins, all belligerent parties become too exhausted to

continue, or there is a negotiated settlement equally unfavorable for all. Unfortunately, external interference prolongs ethnic conflict and prevents one of these three conditions from being met. To put it simply, ethnic conflicts eventually "burn themselves out" if competing groups are left alone.

**APPENDIX A. AZERBAIJAN TABLES<sup>137</sup>**

**TABLE 1. MAJOR ETHNIC GROUP IDENTIFICATION<sup>138</sup>**

<b>Ethnic Group</b>	<b>Language</b>	<b>Written Script</b>	<b>Religion</b>	<b>Region</b>	<b>% of Population</b>
<b>Altaic Peoples</b>					
<i>Turkic:</i> Azerbaijani	Azeri	Cyrillic	Shi'ite, Sunni	Through- out Country	82.7
<b>Caucasian Peoples</b>					
<i>Dagestanis:</i>  Avar Lezgin Tsakhur <small>139</small>	Avar Lezgin, Russian Tsakhur, Azeri	Cyrillic	Sunni	Northern Sectors, Baku	3.2

Ethnic Group	Language	Written Script	Religion	Region	% of Population
<b>Indo-European</b>					
Armenian	Armenian	Armenian	Armenian Orthodox	Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku, Sumgait	5.6
Slavic: Russian	Russian	Cyrillic	Russian Orthodox	Scattered Northern Sectors, Baku	5.6
Iranian: Talysh <sup>141</sup>	Talysh, Azeri	Cyrillic	Sunni, Shi'ite	South-eastern Sectors	
Jews	Tati		Shi'ite, Armeno-Gregorian		

TABLE 2. LANGUAGE AFFILIATIONS (1979)<sup>141</sup>

Ethnic Group	Percentage of persons who consider the language of their ethnic group as their native language	Percentage of persons who know other languages other than their own ethnic group	
		Russian	Others
<b>Azerbaijanis</b>	<b>98.7</b>	<b>27.9</b>	<b>.9</b>
Armenians	77.5	42.9	15.4
<b>Russians</b>	<b>99.9</b>		<b>10.3</b>
Dagestanis	86.6	20.6	51.0
<b>Jews</b>	<b>27.7</b>	<b>24.0</b>	<b>18.2</b>
Others	63.7	35.0	26.6

**TABLE 3. RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS**

<b>Eastern Orthodox</b>	<b>Shi'ite</b>	<b>Sunni</b>	<b>Armeno-Gregorian</b>
Russian Armenian	Azerbaijani Talysh (Minority)	Azerbaijani (Minority) Avar Lezgin Jews Tsakhur Talysh	Jews (Minority)

**TABLE 4. ORIGINAL WRITTEN SCRIPT<sup>142</sup>**

<b>Arabic</b>	<b>Armenian</b>	<b>Cyrillic</b>	<b>Hebrew</b>
Azerbaijani Avar Lezgin	Armenian	Russian	Jews

**TABLE 5. ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF BAKU<sup>143</sup>**

<b>Ethnic Group</b>	<b>1897</b>	<b>% of Pop.</b>	<b>1903</b>	<b>% of Pop.</b>	<b>1913</b>	<b>% of Pop.</b>
Azerbaijani						
Turks	40,148	35.9	44,257	28.4	45,962	21.4
Iranian <sup>144</sup>	9,426	8.4	11,132	7.1	25,096	11.7
Russian	37,399	33.4	56,955	36.5	76,288	35.5
Armenian	19,060	17.0	26,151	16.8	41,680	19.4
Jews	2,341	2.1			9,690	4.5
<b>Total All Groups<sup>145</sup></b>	<b>111,904</b>		<b>155,876</b>		<b>214,672</b>	

**TABLE 6. PUBLIC EDUCATION (SECONDARY SCHOOL)<sup>146</sup>**

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Lessons Per Week</b>	<b>% of Total Lessons</b>
Azerbaijani Language and Literature	63.5	20.5
Russian Language and Literature	44.5	14.4
All Others	202	65.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>310</b>	<b>100</b>

**TABLE 7. AVERAGE MONTHLY WAGES (IN RUBLES)<sup>147</sup>**

<b>Year</b>	<b>National Economy</b>	<b>Industry</b>	<b>Agri-culture</b>	<b>State Insurance</b>	<b>State Govern-ment</b>
1960	77	84	58	67	79
<b>1965</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>97</b>
1970	110	120	78	96	109
<b>1975</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>113</b>
1980	140	161	121	110	125
<b>1985</b>	<b>163</b>	<b>182</b>	<b>159</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>147</b>
1990	195	219	164	271	259

**TABLE 8. ANNUAL PERCENT CHANGE IN MONTHLY WAGES**

<b>Year</b>	<b>National Economy</b>	<b>Industry</b>	<b>Agri- culture</b>	<b>State Insurance</b>	<b>State Government</b>
1960					
<b>1965</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>23</b>
1970	22	26	28	22	12
<b>1975</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>4</b>
1980	12	15	21	6	11
<b>1985</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>18</b>
1990	20	20	3	88	76
<b>1960- 1990</b>	<b>153</b>	<b>161</b>	<b>183</b>	<b>304</b>	<b>227</b>

**TABLE 9. COMPARISON OF GNP (IN DOLLARS) (1990)<sup>148</sup>**

	<b>Azerbaijan</b>	<b>Armenia</b>	<b>Georgia</b>	<b>USSR</b>
GNP*	26,972	15,717	24,677	1,469,793
GNP Per Capita	3,827	4,458	4,529	5,086

\*(In Millions of US Dollars)

**TABLE 10. CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION (IN THOUSAND METRIC TONS)<sup>149</sup>**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Off Shore</b>	<b>% Change</b>	<b>On Shore</b>	<b>% Change</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>% Change</b>
<b>1980</b>	<b>9,600</b>		<b>5,053</b>		<b>14,653</b>	
1981	9,371	(2.4)	4,703	(6.9)	14,074	(4.0)
<b>1982</b>	<b>8,247</b>	<b>(11.0)</b>	<b>4,666</b>	<b>(.8)</b>	<b>12,913</b>	<b>(8.3)</b>
1983	8,409	2.0	4,286	(8.2)	12,695	(1.7)
<b>1984</b>	<b>8,447</b>	<b>.6</b>	<b>4,057</b>	<b>(5.6)</b>	<b>12,504</b>	<b>(1.5)</b>
1985	9,233	9.3	3,909	(3.7)	13,142	5.1
<b>1986</b>	<b>9,419</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>3,902</b>	<b>(.2)</b>	<b>13,321</b>	<b>1.4</b>
1987	10,069	6.9	3,734	(4.3)	13,803	3.6
<b>1988</b>	<b>10,324</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>3,417</b>	<b>(8.5)</b>	<b>13,741</b>	<b>(.5)</b>
1989	10,136	(1.8)	3,023	(11.5)	13,159	(4.2)
<b>1990</b>	<b>9,931</b>	<b>(2.0)</b>	<b>2,582</b>	<b>(14.6)</b>	<b>12,513</b>	<b>(4.0)</b>
1991	9,492	(4.4)	2,249	(12.9)	11,741	(6.2)
<b>1980-</b>						
<b>1991</b>		<b>(1.1)</b>		<b>(55.5)</b>		<b>(19.9)</b>

**TABLE 11. REFINERY PRODUCTION (IN THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS)<sup>150</sup>**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Crude Refined</b>	<b>% Change</b>	<b>Products Produced</b>	<b>% Change</b>
1985	21,118.0		20,262.9	
<b>1986</b>	<b>22,022.1</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>21,715.9</b>	<b>7.8</b>
1987	22,101.4	4.4	21,081.5	(2.9)
<b>1988</b>	<b>21,699.6</b>	<b>(1.9)</b>	<b>20,799.1</b>	<b>(1.4)</b>
1989	18,395.3	(15.2)	17,539.3	(15.7)
<b>1990</b>	<b>16,331.6</b>	<b>(11.2)</b>	<b>15,617.6</b>	<b>(11.0)</b>
1991	15,827.0	(4.1)	15,192.9	(2.7)
<b>1985-1991</b>		<b>(25.1)</b>		<b>(25.0)</b>

**TABLE 12. INTERREPUBLIC TRADE (IN MILLIONS OF RUBLES) (1991)<sup>151</sup>**

<b>Republics</b>	<b>Export</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Import</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>Slavic</b>	<b>8,912.4</b>	<b>77.8</b>	<b>7,704.6</b>	<b>87.2</b>
Baltic	241.3	2.1	123.6	1.4
<b>Central Asian</b>	<b>1,467.6</b>	<b>12.8</b>	<b>773.2</b>	<b>8.7</b>
Southern	833.9	7.3	235.2	2.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>11,455.2</b>		<b>8,836.6</b>	

**TABLE 13. ETHNIC GROUP COMPOSITION OF EMPLOYED PERSONS IN BAKU OIL DISTRICTS (1913)<sup>152</sup>**

<b>Occupation</b>	<b>Russian</b>	<b>Armenian</b>	<b>Azerbaijani</b>	<b>"Persian"</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Owners</b>					
Nonoil	125	255	510	254	1,275
Oil	3	6	347	25	397
<b>Managers</b>					
Nonoil	126	61	41	10	324
Oil Extraction	585	666	305	54	2,083
Oil Refining	73	36	1	1	149
Trade and Credit	74	104	100	88	450
<b>Workers</b>					
Nonoil	2,542	1,697	472	1,484	7,015
Oil Extraction	5,415	6,082	4,340	11,508	34,479
Oil Refining	908	206	29	225	1,487
<b>Professional</b>					
Admini- stration	74	68	34	46	258
Security	605	59	34	3	882
Judici- ary	3	0	0	0	3
Medical	155	98	1	0	358

Note: Total includes undifferentiated ethnic groups.

**TABLE 14. PERCENTAGE ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF EMPLOYED PERSONS  
IN BAKU OIL DISTRICTS (1913)**

<b>Occupation</b>	<b>Russian</b>	<b>Armenian</b>	<b>Azerbaijani</b>	<b>"Persian"</b>
<i>Owners</i>	7.7	15.6	51.3	16.7
Nonoil	9.8	20.0	40.0	19.9
Oil	.1	1.5	87.4	6.3
<i>Managers</i>	24.9	28.8	14.9	5.1
Nonoil	38.9	18.8	12.7	3.1
Oil Extraction	28.1	32.0	14.6	2.6
Oil Refining	49.0	24.2	.7	.7
Trade and Credit	16.4	23.1	22.2	19.6
<i>Workers</i>	20.1	18.6	11.2	30.8
Nonoil	36.2	24.2	6.7	21.2
Oil Extraction	15.7	17.6	12.6	33.4
Oil Refining	61.1	13.9	2.0	15.1
<i>Profes- sional</i>	55.8	14.4	4.5	3.2
Admin- istration	28.7	26.4	13.2	17.8
Security	68.6	6.7	3.9	.3
Judiciary	100	0	0	0
Medical	43.3	27.3	.3	0

## APPENDIX B. LEBANON TABLES

**TABLE 15. MAJOR ETHNIC GROUP IDENTIFICATION**

Ethnic Group	Language	Region	% of Population
<b>Christian</b>			
<i>Maronite</i>	Arabic, Aramaic	Mount Lebanon, East Beirut	24
<i>Armenian Orthodox</i>	Armenian	Biqa Valley, Beirut	5
<i>Armenian Catholic</i>	Armenian	Biqa Valley	1
<i>Greek Orthodox</i>	Arabic	Urban Centers, Shuf Mountains, Beirut	5
<i>Greek Catholic</i>	Arabic	Central & East	3
<i>Protestant</i>	Arabic	Beirut	1
<i>Others</i>	Mixed	Scattered	1
<b>Muslim</b>			
<i>Sunni</i>	Arabic	Urban Centers, West Beirut	21
<i>Shi'a</i>	Arabic	Biqa Valley, Southern, Beirut	32
<i>Druze</i>	Arabic	Shuf Mountains	7

TABLE 16. POPULATION DATA BY RELIGIOUS GROUP<sup>153</sup>

Group	1932	1946	1951	1958	1974	1983
<b>Christian</b>						
<b>Maro- nite</b>	<b>226,378</b>	<b>337,734</b>	<b>377,544</b>	<b>424,000</b>	<b>878,892</b>	<b>900,000</b>
Armen- ian Ortho- dox	31,156	61,600	67,139	69,000		175000
<b>Armen- ian Catho- lics</b>		<b>10,410</b>	<b>14,218</b>	<b>14,500</b>	<b>24,500</b>	
Greek Ortho- dox	76,522	113,197	130,858	150,000		250000
<b>Greek Catho- lics</b>	<b>45,999</b>	<b>66,542</b>	<b>81,764</b>	<b>91,000</b>	<b>191,889</b>	
Protest ants	22,308	10,783	12,641	14,000		50,000
<b>Muslim</b>						
Sunni	175,925	244,307	271,734	286,000		750,000
<b>Shi'ia</b>	<b>154,208</b>	<b>217,520</b>	<b>237,107</b>	<b>250,000</b>		<b>1100000</b>
Druze	53,047	77,023	82,268	88,000		250,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>785,543</b>	<b>1165208</b>	<b>1303951</b>	<b>1550500</b>	<b>3100000</b>	<b>3575000</b>

TABLE 17. POPULATION DATA BY RELIGIOUS GROUP (%)

Group	1932	1946	1951	1958	1973	1983
<b>Christian</b>						
<b>Maronite</b>	29	29	29	27	28	25
Armenian Orthodox	4 <sup>161</sup>	5	5	5		5 <sup>161</sup>
<b>Armenian Catholics</b>		1	1	1	1	
Greek Orthodox	10	10	10	10		7 <sup>161</sup>
<b>Greek Catholics</b>	6	6	6	6	6	
Protestants		1	1	1		1
<b>Other</b>	3 <sup>161</sup>	1	3	8		3
<b>Muslim</b>						
Sunni	22	21	21	19		21
<b>Shi'ia</b>	19	19	18	16		31
Druze	7	7	6	6		7

**TABLE 18. COMPARISON OF CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM GROUPS (%)**

<b>Group</b>	<b>1932</b>	<b>1946</b>	<b>1951</b>	<b>1958</b>	<b>1983</b>
Christ- ian	52	53	55	59	41
Muslim	48	47	45	41	59

**TABLE 19. REGISTERED PALESTINIAN REFUGEES<sup>102</sup>**

<b>1973</b>	<b>1982</b>	<b>1985</b>	<b>1987</b>	<b>1990</b>
187,529	238,647	263,599	276,231	302,049

TABLE 20. 1975 CIVIL WAR MAJOR GROUPS<sup>163</sup>

Name	Power Base	Leadership
<b>The Lebanese Front</b>		
Kata'ib (Phalange)	Maronite/Beirut, Mount Lebanon	Gemayel Family
National Liberal Party (Ahrar)	Maronite/Metn, Damour, Beirut	Chamoun Family
Zghorta Liberation Army	Maronite/Zghorta	Franjeh Family
<b>The National Movement</b>		
Progressive Socialist Party	Druze/Shuf. Metn	Kemal Jumblat
Syrian National Socialist Party	Orthodox and Muslims/Beirut and Metn	In'am Ra'd
Murabitum (Independent Nasserists)	Sunni/Beirut	Ibrahim Qulaylat
Lebanese Communist Party	Various	George Hawi
Ba'ath Socialist Party	(Syria)	Asim Qansuh
Ba'ath Socialist Party	(Iraq)	Abd al Majid al Rafi'i
Amal	Shi'ite/Beirut, Biqa and south	Musa al Sadr

**TABLE 21. LEBANESE REGULAR ARMY UNITS<sup>164</sup>**

<b>Designation</b>	<b>Religious Affiliation</b>	<b>Size</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
1st Brigade	100% Shia		Biga Valley, Assimilated by Syrian Army and Shia Militias
2d Brigade	Sunni		Tripoli, Dispersed
3d Brigade	Sunni		Disbanded
4th Brigade	Druze		Disintegrated in 1984 Mountain War
5th Brigade	Maronite	2,000	Loyal to President
6th Brigade	Shia	1,600	Beirut Operational control of Amal
7th Brigade		1,700	Loyal to President
8th Brigade	80% Christian 20% Sunni	2,000	Loyal to President
9th Brigade	Greek Orthodox Commander Mixed		Loyal to Government
10th Brigade	Christian	1,800	
11th Brigade	Druze	900	
12th Brigade	Shia	1,300	South Lebanon

## APPENDIX C. NICARAGUA TABLES

**TABLE 22. MAJOR ETHNIC GROUP IDENTIFICATION<sup>165</sup>**

<b>Ethnic Group</b>	<b>Language</b>	<b>Religion</b>	<b>Region</b>	<b>% of Population</b>
Mestizo (Landino)	Spanish	Roman Catholic	Pacific Coast; Central Highlands	70
Indian:		Protestant (Moravian)	Atlantic Coast	4
Miskito (Costenos)	Miskito		Northeast and Central Atlantic Coast	
Rama	Miskito		Bluefields	
Sumo	Miskito		Rio Coco River Border	
Garifona (Carib)	English		Pearl Lagoon	
Creole (Black)	English	Protestant	Urban Atlantic Coast	9
White	English, Spanish	Protestant, Roman Catholic	Scattered Urban Areas	17

## ENDNOTES

1. The vogue term *global village* is more commonly used to describe the inter-connectivity of the modern world. I have replaced this with *global city* because it more accurately depicts the complex nature of a mutually dependent world. While a "village" is generally homogeneous, a "city" is distinctly heterogeneous. Within the confines of a multi-national city there are usually ethnic ghettos. These ethnic communities maintain distinct identities separate from the city's overall characteristic.
2. See Ken Jowitt, *The New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
3. An excellent discussion of the transnational aspects of hyper-nationalism and regional security implications is found in Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace" in *The Cold War and After*, edited by Jean M. Lynn-Jones (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992), 236-240.
4. Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 1.
5. There are two factors that account for this exponential growth in national consciousness. First, the demise of the former Soviet Union signalled the end of an era of purposeful suppression of selected national identities. The Soviets consciously and conspicuously manipulated ethnic groups to achieve their political objectives not only within the USSR but also within their sphere of influence. Other Communist-inspired governments also recognized the inherent theoretical conflict between Marxism and nationalism. Thus, while many ethnic groups were beginning to develop a sense of national identity at the beginning of the twentieth century, others groups were suppressed. Second, mass media and information penetration promotes national consciousness. Contact with other people highlights differences. This has allowed scattered people to recognize that they share commonality with some groups and differences with others. National consciousness is fostered by inter-group relations and activities, not isolation. Third, nationalism is an artificial construction for political purposes. Political leaders invoke nationalism to mobilize a constituency. Walker Connor and Louis Snyder's cited works provide an excellent and informative in depth analysis of this phenomena. Also see Cynthia H. Enloe, *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), Carlton J. H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1968), Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), Harold R. Isaacs, *Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), T. V. Sathyamurthy, *Nationalism in the Contemporary World: Political and Sociological Perspectives* (Totowa, NJ: Allanheld, Osmun and Company, 1983), and Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1993).

6. For a complete discussion of levels of analysis see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: a Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

7. A notable exception to this general rule is the Palestinian Liberation Organization that received official recognition and state status with the United Nations. This recognition has now been bolstered by the negotiations for the PLO to control the Gaza strip and the West Bank in Israel.

8. A comprehensive discussion of each of the determinants and their role in ethnic group identity is found in *Ethnic Autonomy-Comparative Dynamics*, edited by Raymond Hall (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979). This valuable work has many contributors that examine separately the relationship between *micro-variables* and political goals of ethnic groups. The idea of distinguishing between major and minor determinants, however, is my own creation. One variable that I did not incorporate into my discussion of ethnic group identity is *patterns of domination*. However, I discuss this idea under the heading "Sources of Ethnic Conflict" in a much broader context.

9. The importance of language as a discriminant in ethnic group identification is confirmed in several sources found in the bibliography. The specific references are too numerous to list but the most cogent statement of the role of language in nationalism (ethnic group identification) is from Max Boehm in his 1933 contribution to the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*:

The concept of a mother tongue has made language the source from which springs all intellectual and spiritual existence. The mother tongue represents the most suitable expression of spiritual individuality ... A people not only transmits the store of all its memories through the vocabulary of its language, but in syntax, word rhythm it finds the most faithful expression of its temperament and general emotional life. The rare cases wherein a people retained its individuality despite the loss of its language do not disprove the conviction of a people or national group that they are defending in language the very

cornerstone of their national existence. The encouragement of dialect is somewhat analogous to the regionalist cult of the local homeland (235).

10. An interesting discussion of the relationship between language and thought processes is found in John W. Berry et al *Cross-cultural psychology: Research and applications* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992)

11. I prefer the word *genetics* to the more common *race*. The use of *race* to describe an ethnic group too often takes on a pejorative attribute that should be avoided. Having said that, however, genetic traits are the fundamental basis for racism.

12. *Ethnic Autonomy-Comparative Dynamics*, edited by Raymond L. Hall (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), xxvi.

13. This statement directly contradicts the view of Orlando Patterson in his book *Ethnic Chauvinism* (New York: Stein and Day, 1977), 105. Although I agree that classes are economic groups, they can become default ethnic groups. This occurs when class members primary basis of comparison with other members of society is economic or social status (Karl Marx would certainly have agreed with this logic). Donald Horowitz explains it differently in his book *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 21-36. He draws a distinction between societies with ranked and unranked ethnic groups:

... stratification in ranked systems is synonymous with ethnic membership. Mobility opportunities are restricted by group identification (22).

14. Political authorities often decide the distribution of scarce resources in a stratified society. Although they approach political authority from different perspectives, Leites and Wolf, Popkin, and Scott all discuss how a breakdown in the distribution process leads to social revolution.

15. For detailed case studies of preferential public policies see *Ethnic Preference and Public Policy in Developing States*, edited by Neil Nevitte and Charles H. Kennedy (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986).

16. Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 186.

17. Cynthia H. Enloe in *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1973) states:

There are several reasons why ethnic groups per se rarely become the focus of revolution. First, ethnicity is not primarily ideological or political; rather, it is cultural and social. Ethnic groups have enormous potential for political development, but politics remain secondary to other bonds and values shared by members. Second, in times of crisis ethnic communities are harder to expand than are ideological or functional associations ... Finally, by being more exclusive and having boundaries more visible, ethnic groups have a difficult time winning the confidence and trust of potential allies. Their objectives seem too parochial and their leadership too alien to excite active participation within the majority (222).

Although this is a compelling argument, I contend that the enormous potential she wrote about twenty years ago is today being mobilized for essentially parochial objectives.

18. For a discussion of the related concept of relative deprivation, see Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

19. Samuel P. Huntington explains how social frustration because of inadequate institutions leads to political participation and ultimately political instability in his book *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976). I have taken some liberty to expand his arguments to include ethnic groups.

20. For a full explanation of the moral disengagement phenomena see Albert Bandura, "Mechanisms of moral disengagement" in *Origins of Terror*, edited by Walter Reich (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 161-191.

21. Donald L. Horowitz has an excellent discussion of the idea of emulation and fear of extinction in *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 171-181

22. The use of political goals in this context refers to the political status of a nation-states, their sub-divisions, and political representation in governments. If we accept that political authority leads to economic authority, then achievement of political goals also secures economic objectives.

23. Samuel P. Huntington outlines this distinction in his book *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 78-92.

24. The anthropological divisions cited are a distillation and compilation of the following works: Ronald Wixman, *The Peoples of the USSR: An Ethnographic Handbook* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Fact Book 1992* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992); Central Intelligence Agency, Map Number 724594 (R000397), 3-94; PC Globe Rel. 5., PC Globe, Inc., Tempe, Arizona.

25. This case study does not use the terms state and nation interchangeably. State refers to the political organization with established and recognized (even if in dispute) borders. The term nation is reserved for a group of people who have a collective sense of identity. Nations do not necessarily have established and recognized borders. The members of a nation do, however, occupy and control territories. Any serious investigation of ethnic conflict must draw this distinction. For further amplification of this principle, see the collected works of Walker Connor cited in the bibliography.

26. Numerous references identify language as the determinant that defines ethnicity. Certainly it is a crucial element that provides the cognitive framework that shapes peoples interpretation of events and their physical environment. An insightful discussion of this linkage is found in John W. Berry and others, *Cross-cultural psychology: Research and applications* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 101-109.

27. Frank Huddle, Jr., "Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijanis" in *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities*, ed. Zev Katz, Rosemarie Rogers, and Fredric Harned (New York: The Free Press, 1975), 197-198.

28. Wixman, 184 and 194-195.

29. The Soviets had a definite program to adjust and manipulate the written languages of the various republics. Azerbaijan was no exception. Wixman cites numerous examples of this policy. Also cited by Huddle, 197. The best discussion titles the process *linguistic nationalism*, Walter Kolarz, *Russia and Her Colonies*, reprinted 3rd edition (New York: Archon Books, 1967), 18-19.

30. According to Gerard J. Libardian, ed. *The Karabagh File: Documents and Facts on the Region of Mountainous Karabagh, 1919-1988*, 1st edition (Toronto: The Zoryan Institute, 1988), 133, in 1976 The ethnic composition of mountainous Karabagh (a subsection of Nagorno-Karabakh) was:

Armenians            81%

Azeris 18%  
Russians 1%

31. The most important historical controversy is the death of many Armenians in Azerbaijan in 1905 and in Turkey in 1915. The Armenians refer to the Turkish event as the Genocide of 1915. Without additional elaboration, both groups place culpability on the other.

32. While much of this analysis is speculative based on historical evidence, current events appear to validate the suppositions. In general, there are very few instances where an ethnic group actually definitely identifies the root causes of their racial dislike for another group. Mostly, it is just perceived reality. Then again, perceptions can be reality.

33. Audrey L. Altstadt states the principle of historical analysis quite nicely and succinctly as:

*Soviet historians seek to clarify the ethnic and cultural roots of Azerbaijani Turks in the distant past.*

Audrey L. Altstadt, *The Azerbaijan Turks: Power and Identity under the Russian Rule* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 1.

34. The importance of history to understanding contemporary issues is addressed by Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers* (New York: The Free Press, 1986).

35. Oil has been exported from the Baku area since at least the tenth century. Altstadt, 21.

36. A short chronology of conquest shows this pattern of domination and the seeds of conflict:

Beginning of Recorded History - 7th Century AD  
Armenians move into and occupy region.

8th Century - 19th Century  
Arabs conquer to the area and trade the principalities among the warring states.

19th Century  
Russia invades and secures territory in 1805.

1905

Azeri's massacre Armenians in Transcaucus.

1918

Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan declared. Nakhichevan and Karabagh are given status of autonomous districts under the protectorate of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijanis massacre 15,000-20,000 Armenians.

1919

Armenia and Karabagh declare themselves inseparable. Azerbaijani impose rule by force.

1920

Soviet Red Army occupies Azerbaijan and Armenia. Both declared Soviet Republics.

1920-1988

General Armenian unrest in Karabagh and Baku.

1988

Azerbaijanis attack Armenians in Karabagh, Baku, and Sumgait. Red Army invades.

30 August 1991

Azerbaijan declares independence.

26 November 1991

Azerbaijan revokes autonomous status of Nagorno-Karabagh. Karabagh Committee retaliates by declaring itself the Nagorno-Karabagh Republic.

Libardian, 145-154 and CIA, *The World Fact Book* 1992, 24.

37. Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 22 and 186-196.

38. See Altstadt, 29-33.

39. See Altstadt, 40.

40. According to Graham Smith, there were four main points to the Soviet policies towards the republics:

1. *The Soviet federation denies the nationalities the right to national self-determination, with only a minimal degree of political manoeuvrability being granted to the local party-state machine in running*

the union republic. . . .

2. As a product of central policy, each of the non-Russian republics has developed a specialized, core-dependent economy . . . and concomitant specialized territorial division of labour. . . .

3. The upward mobility of natives within their union republic homelands has been aided by affirmative action policies which have contributed to the nativization of the local political leadership and to the growth of an indigenous middle class through preferential access to higher education and to party membership. . . .

4. Each of the non-Russian republics possesses a flourishing native culture and language aided by a variety of institutional supports provided as a consequence of their territorial status. Yet local cultures, while supported by the Soviet federation, have also been subjected to standardizing linguistic and cultural pressure from a Russian-dominated state.

Graham Smith, "The Soviet federation: from corporatist to crisis politics" in *Shared Space: Divided Space*, edited by Michael Chisholm and David M. Smith (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 85-86.

41. Audrey L. Altstadt correctly states that the key to understanding the political climate in Azerbaijan is to understand the importance of the Russians:

*Since the Russian conquest early in the nineteenth century, the central issue in the political life of Azerbaijan has been the relationship with the Russians. Relations with other peoples, though historically significant and sporadically crucial, have become secondary. (p. xxiii)*

42. *Azerbaidzhan has had an especially strong reputation for pervasive mafia-type networks. Azerbaidzhani patron-client relationships have been rooted in geographical and clan ties that transcend the political rivalries of the Soviet period. . . . the presence or absence of Moscow's support has been critical to the functioning and fate of its regimes.*

John P. Willerton, *Patronage and Politics in the USSR* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 191-192.

43. See Altstadt, 20-23 and John Odling-Smee, *Economic Review: Azerbaijan* (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, May 1992), 1-18.

44. See Altstadt, 38.

45. Inadequate investment and technological obsolescence combined with environmental problems are the direct causes of production decline. See Odling-Smee, 13-18.

46. See Altstadt, 30-32.

47. The sentiment of the Russians and Armenians is summed up well by Audrey L. Altstadt

*Russians and Armenians sometimes expressed their perception that Baku was their island in an 'alien' ocean, forgetting that the ocean was the native population. Azerbaijani Turks in Baku, however, were conscious of links to the hinterlands from which both the intellectuals and workers had come (p. 49).*

48. See Altstadt, 35.

49. See Libardian, 133 and Rasma Karlins, *Ethnic Relations in the USSR: The Perspective From Below* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1986), 230 and 232.

50. See Horowitz, 108-116.

51. See Altstadt, 50-62.

52. Nissman and Altstadt conflict in their views of this issue. In congressional testimony, Nissman categorically stated that religion is not an issue. Altstadt discusses the Muslim-Christian cleavage and conflict throughout her scholarly book. Other students of Azerbaijan also mention this natural source of conflict and I agree with their assessment. See Gitelman, 9 and U.S. Congress, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *The Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis: Prospects for Resolution*, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 23 October 1991, 27-31.

53. Although the term self-determination has become a cliché for any national movement, there is not a better one available to describe the condition in Azerbaijan. See *Conflict in the Soviet Union: Black January in Azerbaïdzhân* (New York: Human Right Watch, May 1991), 5-6.

54. For details of this wide ranging "plan" see Yuri Rost, *Armenian Tragedy* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1990), 6.
55. Two of the groups, the Ramgavars and Hunchaks, are Pro-Soviet. The third, the Dashnaks, is vehemently Anti-Soviet. See Rost, 8-11.
56. For a detailed explanation see Horowitz, 185-228
57. See *Conflict in the USSR*, 5-6, Gitelman, 3-8.
58. For a complete discussion of the linkage between conflict and social mobilization, see Huntington, 53-56.
59. It is argumentative to describe any Lebanese ethnic group as native. Within this case study, native Lebanese are those that occupied the area prior to the end of the Nineteenth Century. This roughly distinguishes the relatively new immigration of Armenians and Palestinians from the original Christian and Muslim Arab inhabitants.
60. Numerous reference identify language as the determinant that defines ethnicity. Certainly is as a crucial element that provides the cognitive framework that shapes peoples interpretation of events and their physical environment. An insightful discussion of this linkage is found in John W. Berry, et al, *Cross-cultural psychology: Research and applications* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 101-109.
7. See David C. Gordon, *The Republic of Lebanon: Nation in Jeopardy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), 51-52.
62. The Muslim intelligentsia also speak French but their numbers are significantly less than those of the Maronite Christians.
63. Muslim intelligentsia also have a command of French through the education system but not to the degree that the Maronites do.
64. This case study does not use the terms state and nation interchangeably. State refers to the political organization with established and recognized (even if in dispute) borders. The term nation is reserved for a group of people who have a collective sense of identity. Nations do not necessarily have established and recognized borders. The members of a nation do, however, occupy and control territories. Any serious investigation of ethnic conflict must draw this distinction. for further amplification of this principle, see the collected works of Walker Connor cited in the bibliography.

65. Gordon, p. 33.
66. Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 22 and 186-196.
67. David McDowall, *Lebanon: A conflict of minorities*, Minority Rights Group Report Number 61 (London: Minority Rights Group, 1986), 14.
68. McDowall, 14.
69. See Thomas Collelo, ed, *Lebanon: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1987), 55-59 and 143-152.
70. See Gordon, 77.
71. See R. Hrair Dekmejian, *Patterns of Political Leadership: Egypt, Israel, Lebanon* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975), 11-101 and Elie A. Salem, *Modernization without Revolution: Lebanon's Experience* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973), 52-74.
72. Trevor N. Depuy and Paul Martell, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the 1982 War in Lebanon* (Fairfax, VA: Hero Books, 1986), 29-30.
73. See Depuy, 31-36 and McDowall, 14.
74. See Gordon, 91-95 and Itamar Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon: 1970-1983* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 31, 34, 40-42.
75. Gordon, 49.
76. Gordon, 51.
77. Gordon, 129-130.
78. Numerous sources support this political goal of the PLO. However, historical facts are even more telling. The recent self-rule movements for the Gaza Strip and Jericho are just the latest manifestations of these goals.
79. Rabinovich, 96.
80. Rabinovich, 97.
81. See Collelo, 239-243.

82. Collelo, 186.
83. The result of this defeat was the Melkart Agreement that allowed the PLO virtual autonomy in Lebanon, including the right to an independent militia outside of Lebanese government control. See Collelo, 188.
84. Collelo, 189.
85. Collelo, 189 and 222-226.
86. The current negotiations between Israel and the PLO to resolve just this issue will allow Lebanon to also move forward in solving its internal problems.
87. The anthropological divisions cited come from a distillation and compilation of the following works: James D. Rudolph, ed., *Nicaragua. a country study* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982), Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Fact Book 1992* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), and maps provided by Bernard Nietschmann to U.S. Congress, House, Task Force on Central America, Republican Study Committee, *Violence and Oppression in Nicaragua* (Washington, D.C.: The American Conservative Union, 1984).
88. Rudolph, xiv.
89. I prefer the word *genetics* to the more common *race*. The use of *race* to describe an ethnic group too often takes on a pejorative attribute that should be avoided. Having said that, however, genetic traits are the fundamental basis for racism.
90. See Rudolph, 63-101.
91. See Rudolph, 92.
92. See Rudolph, 3-27.
93. The importance of history to understanding contemporary issues is addressed by Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers* (New York: The Free Press, 1986).
94. While some of this analysis is speculative based on historical evidence, counterrevolutionary events appear to have validated the suppositions. In general, there are very few instances where an ethnic group actually definitely identifies the root causes of their racial dislike for another group. Mostly, it is just *perceived reality*. Then again, perceptions

can be reality.

95. See U.S. Department of State, *Human Rights in Nicaragua under the Sandinistas: From Revolution to Repression* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986), 60.

96. For a detailed description of the Sandinistas' Marxist ideology see David Nolan, *The Ideology of the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Revolution* (Coral Gables, FL: Institute of Interamerican Studies, University of Miami, 1988).

97. See U.S. Department of State, *Human Rights*. . . , 60.

98. See Rudolph, 91.

99. See U.S. Department of State, *Human Rights*. . . , 60.

100. The reason for integration is obvious:

*The concerted effort to integrate the Atlantic Coast region into mainstream Nicaraguan life was, in large part, a recognition that this vast, underpopulated region could serve - as it had in the past - as a staging area for counterrevolution. Traditionally isolated from the heartland of Nicaragua in the largely mestizo Pacific region, the residents of the Atlantic Coast, about half of whom are Miskito Indians who had played virtually no role in the struggle to overthrow Somoza, were initially wary of the new government (Rudolph, xxvi).*

101. ALPROMISU is an acronym for Alliance for the Progress of Miskitos and Sumos.

102. MISURASATA is an acronym for Miskito, Sumo, Rama, and Sandinista Unity.

103. See Rudolph, 162-164.

104. See Shirley Christian, *Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family* (New York: Vintage Books, 1986), 298.

105. See U.S. Department of State, *Dispossessed: the Miskito Indians in Sandinista Nicaragua* (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1986), 3.

106. This new organization was still Indian-based but dropped the Sandinistas from the name and orientation.

107. See Christian, 300-301.
108. See Glenn Garvin, *Everybody Had His Own Gringo: The CIA & the Contras* (New York: Brassey's, 1992), 17.
109. In some cases the elders were simply killed. See Garvin, 19.
110. A complete discussion of societal stratification is found in Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 22 and 186-196).
111. See Rudolph, 92-93.
112. See Rudolph, 105-130.
113. Horowitz, 171-181.
114. See Congress, House, Republican Study Committee, *Violence and Oppression in Nicaragua: Hearing Before the Task Force on Central America*, 28 June 1984, 73-78; and Rudolph, 168.
115. FDN is an acronym for Nicaraguan Democratic Force.
116. See Rudolph, 174.
117. ARDE is an acronym for Democratic Revolutionary Alliance.
118. Although the term *self-determination* has become a clique for any national movement, this is exactly what the Indian and Creole *freedom-fighters* hoped to return to.
119. For excellent discussions of the politics of dominance see Horowitz, and Richard M. Burkey, *Ethnic & Racial Groups: The Dynamics of Dominance* (Menlo Park, CA: Cummings Publishing Company, 1978).
120. Government militia were lightly armed groups of locals recruited by the Sandinistas to *maintain order as required*. In actuality, they were ill-trained and ill-led. For all intents and purposes they were merely armed gangs that were loosely accountable to the central government.
121. See *Human Rights. . .*, 60-64; C.P.D.H. *Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Nicaragua* (New York: Puebla Institute, 1987); Nina H. Shea, "Testimony for Nicaraguan Refugees," *Nicaragua in Focus*, Vol. 1, No. 4, Joseph E. Davis, ed. (New York: Puebla Institute, 1987), 16-23; and Congress, Senate, Republican Policy Committee, *Turmoil in Central America*

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986), 45-53.

122. See U.S Department of State, *Dispossessed*. . . , 3-4; Congress, Senate, *Turmoil*. . . , 60-61.

123. See Jiri and Virginia Valenta, "The FSLN in Power," *Conflict in Nicaragua: A Multidimensional Perspective*, edited by Jiri Valenta and Esperanza Duran (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 20-21.

124. See Garvin, 68.

125. For a complete discussion of levels of analysis see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: a Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

126. A notable exception to this general rule is the Palestinian Liberation Organization that received official recognition and state status within the United Nations. This recognition has now been bolstered by the negotiations for the PLO to control the Gaza strip and the West Bank in Israel.

127. For an excellent discussion of neorealism theory that outlines both the positive and negative aspects, see Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

128. Waltz, *Man, the State and War*, 159-186.

129. See Paul K. Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 15-27 and Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 69-91.

130. See Waltz, *Man, the State and War*, 80-123.

131. See Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reductionist and Systemic Theories," in *Neorealism and its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

132. Huth, 17.

133. According to Graham Smith, there were four main points to the Soviet policies towards the republics:

1. *The Soviet federation denies the nationalities the right to national self-determination, with only a minimal degree of political manoeuvrability being granted to the local party-state machine in running*

the union republic. . . .

2. As a product of central policy, each of the non-Russian republics has developed a specialized, core-dependent economy . . . and concomitant specialized territorial division of labour. . . .

3. The upward mobility of natives within their union republic homelands has been aided by affirmative action policies which have contributed to the nativization of the local political leadership and to the growth of an indigenous middle class through preferential access to higher education and to party membership. . . .

4. Each of the non-Russian republics possesses a flourishing native culture and language aided by a variety of institutional supports provided as a consequence of their territorial status. Yet local cultures, while supported by the Soviet federation, have also been subjected to standardizing linguistic and cultural pressure from a Russian-dominated state.

Graham Smith, "The Soviet federation: from corporatist to crisis politics" in *Shared Space: Divided Space*, edited by Michael Chisholm and David M. Smith (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 85-86.

134. State refers to the political organization with established and recognized (even if in dispute) borders. The term nation is reserved for a group of people who have a collective sense of identity. For further amplification see the collected works of Walker Conner cited in the bibliography.

135. See J. Philip Rogers, "Crisis Bargaining Codes and Crisis Management," in *Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).

136. For a detailed discussion of how misperception shapes leader behavior, see Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

137. Unfortunately, much of the demographic data for Azerbaijan is only available in Russian. Therefore, I have relied in some cases on secondary sources with their built in prejudices. However, I believe that the historical demographic data is still valuable and provides insight into the current ethnic strife within Azerbaijan for two reasons. First, ethnic groups have long racial memories. Imagined or real injustices of the past

manifest themselves in contemporary hatreds. Second, there are too many examples where past socio-economic discrepancies provide the basis for present conditions to ignore or dismiss their importance.

138. Sources consulted:

Ronald Wixman, *The Peoples of the USSR: An Ethnographic Handbook* (Armonk, NY: M.E Sharpe, 1984), 13, 15-18, 125-126, 138-139, 168-170, 184, 194-195, 231-245.

Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Fact Book 1992* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), 24.

Central Intelligence Agency, Map Number 724594 (R000397), 3-92

PC Globe Rel. 5, PC Globe, Inc., Tempe, Arizona.

139. The Tsakhur are being heavily assimilated into Azerbaijani culture and most have lost their native language. Many also speak fluent Avar and Russian. Robert Wixman, 194-195.

140. The Talysh are nearly completely assimilated into the Azerbaijani culture. Robert Wixman, 184.

141. Source consulted:

Vinod Mehta, *Soviet Economy: Development of Azerbaijan*, (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1982), 16.

142. In 1928, with the notable exceptions of Russian and Armenian, Latin became the official written script for all languages. Again with the same exceptions, the official written script was changed to Cyrillic in 1938.

143. Source consulted:

Audrey L. Altstadt, *The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 32.

144. Iranian totals include a large, undifferentiated number of Iranian Azerbaijanis.

145. The total of all groups includes others not listed.

146. Source Consulted

R. Avakov, *Public Education in Soviet Azerbaijan: Appraisal of an*

*Achievement*, Translated (Paris: Progress Publishers, 1984), 153.

147. Sources Consulted:

Vinod Mehta, *Soviet Economy: Development of Azerbaijan* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers: 1982), 84-85.

John Odling-Smee, *Economic Review: Azerbaijan* (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, May 1992), 84.

148. Source Consulted:

PC Globe Rel. 5, PC Globe, Inc., Tempe, Arizona

149. Source consulted:

John Odling-Smee, *Economic Review: Azerbaijan* (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, May 1992), 75.

150. Source Consulted:

John Odling-Smee, *Economic Review: Azerbaijan* (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, May 1992), 76.

151. Source Consulted:

John Odling-Smee, *Economic Review: Azerbaijan* (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, May 1992), 66.

152. Source consulted:

Audrey L. Altstadt, *The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 37.

153. The last official census in Lebanon was conducted in 1932. These population figures are estimations from the United Nations. Sources: *The Middle East and North Africa*, 1-38th Editions, (London: Europa Publications, 1958-1991) and David McDowall, *Lebanon: A conflict of minorities*, Minority Rights Group Report Number 61 (London: Minority Rights Group, 1986).

154. Armenian Orthodox and Catholics population figures were combined in the 1932 census.

155. Armenian Orthodox and Catholic population figures were combined in 1983.

156. Greek Orthodox and Catholic population figures were combined in 1983.
157. Others included Jews, Latins, Protestants, and various eastern Christian groups for the 1932 census.
158. Armenian Orthodox and Catholic percentages were combined in 1932.
159. Armenian Orthodox and Catholic percentages are combined for 1983.
160. Greek Orthodox and Catholic percentages are combined for 1983.
161. Others percentage includes Jews, Latins, Protestants, and various eastern Christian Groups.
162. Source: *The Middle East and North Africa*, 1-38th editions (London: Europa Publications, 1958-1991).
163. This table is reproduced from McDowall, 14.
164. Information current as of 1987, Collelo, 222.
165. Sources:
- Central Intelligence Agency, *World Fact Book 1992* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992).
- James D. Rudolph, ed., *Nicaragua: a country study* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982).

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